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Articles
Piercing the Confidentiality Veil:
Physician Testimony in International
Criminal Trials Against Perpetrators of
Torture
David Weissbrodt
Ferhat Pekin"
Amelia Wilson**
"Whatever, in connection with my professional
practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear,
in the life of men, which ought not to be spoken of
abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning that all
such should be kept secret."'
INTRODUCTION
Physician-patient confidentiality is a notion deeply rooted
in most medical traditions throughout the world.2 Many nations
* Fredrikson and Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
** J.D. 2003, University of Minnesota Law School.

*** J.D. 2004, University of Minnesota Law School.
The authors thank Samuel Heins (J.D. 1972, University of Minnesota Law School,
and founding member and partner of Heins, Mills & Olson, P.L.C.) for his
indispensable assistance in making this article possible as well as Nicholas Velde
and Mary Rumsey for their help in researching this article. The authors also
express their gratitude to the doctor (discussed in Part III infra) and her friends for
her permission to refer to the dilemma she found in testifying about torture in Chad.
1. The Hippocratic Oath, in Roberta M. Berry, The Genetic Revolution and
The Physician's Duty of Confidentiality, 18 J. LEGAL. MED. 401, 408-09 (1997); see
also Ben A. Rich, Post Modern Medicine Deconstructing The HippocraticOath, 65 U.
COLO. L. REV. 77, 90 (1993) (explaining that the last two substantive paragraphs of
the Oath contain prohibitions against sexual relations with patients and breaches of
patient confidentiality; these prohibitions are the only two elements of the Oath
which appear in all modern codes of professional responsibility); see also Bernard
Friedland, Physician-PatientConfidentiality, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 249, 256 (1994).
2. See, e.g., infra notes 72, 96-98, 141-156, 181, 190-192, 243, 299, 314 and
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have codified patient protections and rights with statutes that
emphasize the inviolability of this confidence.3 Physicians are
prohibited, except in limited circumstances, to reveal any confidential information or communication.4 Violating confidentiality often exposes the physician to professional, civil, and
sometimes criminal sanctions.' Confidentiality is designed to
protect the patient's most intimate information as well as foster
a candid relationship between physician and patient to facilitate
successful diagnosis and treatment.6 And yet despite the raison
d'etre of confidentiality laws and ethical rules protecting
confidentiality, there are circumstances in which exceptions do
and ought to exist. This article will argue for an exception to
medical confidentiality where such secrets may assist in proving
the existence of torture and other grave human rights abuses, or
where it may lead to the conviction of those individuals who
commit such acts.
Torture and ill-treatment7 are forbidden by international
law" and U.S. statute. 9 In the wake of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks, some government officials have advocated a
loosened condemnation of the practice of torture. An August
2002 memorandum by the U.S. Justice Department defined
torture far more narrowly than the Convention Against Torture
(Torture Convention),' ° stating,
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in
intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury such as
organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely

accompanying text.
3. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1424 (Warrren T. Reich ed., 1995).
4. See, e.g., infra notes 72, 96-98, 141-156, 181, 190-192, 243, 299, 314 and
accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., infra notes 157-167, 183-189, 250, 300, 314 and accompanying
text.
6. See, e.g., Edington v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185, 194 (1876) ("To
open the door to the disclosure of secrets revealed on the sickbed, or when consulting
a physician, would destroy confidence between the physician and the patient, and, it
is easy to see, might tend very much to prevent the advantages and benefits which
flow from this confidential relationship.").
7. Cf infra notes 148-150 (discussing that states which require doctors to
report ill-treatment will also have laws prohibiting the underlying ill-treatment).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702(d) (2005).
9. See infra notes 154-156.
10. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 197, U.N. GAOR., 39th Sess., Supp. No.
51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984), entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter
Torture Convention].
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mental pain or suffering to amount to torture... it must result in
significant psychological harm of significant duration e.g. lasting for
months or even years.

Operating under the August 2002 memorandum and similar
memoranda, U.S. forces used torture in Afghanistan,
Guantdnamo Bay, and Iraq. 12 The Justice Department issued a
new memorandum on December 31, 2004, redefining torture in
somewhat broader terms. 13 Particularly troubling, and pertinent to this article, was the use of medical
4 records to find the
torture victims' particular vulnerabilities.1
As torture was being applied by U.S. forces, a few scholars
were advocating its reintroduction into the U.S. legal system.
One scholar even advocated a torture warrant,'5 but its use has
been roundly criticized,' 6 even by scholars who acknowledge that
11.

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR

ALBERTO

R.

GONZALES,

COUNSEL

TO

THE

PRESIDENT

1

(2002),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/
dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf.
12.

See JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL To

REVIEW THE DoD DETENTION OPERATIONS, August 2004; Anthony R. Jones,
Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prisonand 205"h Military Intelligence Brigade, 2004,
http://www.defenselink.mil]news/Aug2004/d20040825fay.pdf; Situation of Human
Rights in Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. A/59/370 (Sept. 21, 2004) (preparedby M. Cherif
Bassiouni); Luigi Condorelli & Pasquale De Sena, The Relevance of the Obligations
Flowing from the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to US Courts Dealing
with GuantdnamoDetainees, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 107 (2004) (discussing the legal
status of detainees at Guantdnamo); U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib
Prison, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2004).
13. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, MEMORANDUM FOR
JAMES B. COMEY, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN. (2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/olc]

dagmemo.pdf.
14. See, e.g., John White & Josh Mintz, Red Cross Cites Inhumane Treatment
at Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Dec. 1,
2004, at A10,
available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21262-2004Nov30.html;
cf infra
note 77.
15. ALAN DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS (Yale Univ. Press 2002).
Though not an original idea-as the book itself notes, the English employed a
torture warrant in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-Dershowitz's argument
has brought the torture warrant back into scholarly debate. Id.
16. See, e.g., Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw:
Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
278 (2003); Michael Ratner, Moving Away From the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals,
Executive Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1520-22 (2003)
(rejecting Dershowitz's torture warrants); Chanterelle Sung, Torturing the Ticking
Bomb Terrorist: An Analysis of Judicially Sanctioned Torture in the Context of
Terrorism, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 193 (book review) (arguing that any torture
violates human dignity, international law, and constitutional law). But see Andrew
A. Moher, The Lesser of Two Evils? An Argument for Judicially Sanctioned Torture
in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 469 (2004) (arguing that judicially
sanctioned torture, possibly in the form of torture warrants, would be superior to the
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torture may still occur as a practical reality.17 In light of the
renewed discussion about the use of torture, 8 this article will
first examine various national and international approaches to
physician-patient confidentiality, then explore possible legal
responses to an actual situation involving torture in a Chadian
prison and a physician's testimony against its perpetrators.
Some of the issues that will be addressed are (1) whether
communications between a physician and torture victims are

considered confidential; (2) whether testifying in a tribunal
about the substance of the communications amounts to a breach
of confidentiality; (3) whether exceptions to the rule of
confidentiality exist to allow for the admissibility of the
physician's testimony; and (4) whether an exception should be
established for a physician's testimony where, without such
testimony, prosecution of perpetrators of torture would be
severely impaired.

I. BACKGROUND: EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS AND THEIR
APPROACHES TO MEDICAL CONFIDENTIALITY
To explore the role physician-patient confidentiality plays
in international law as well as other legal systems, it is helpful
to examine a sample of principal legal systems. The article will
survey international criminal law, international customary law,
U.S. federal court practices, French criminal law, English
criminal law, Japanese criminal law, and Belgian criminal law.

present system of underground torture or a system of "torture lite").
17. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic
Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (2004) (rejecting the
use of torture warrants and the continued illegality of torture while arguing that
violation of the law may be followed by public ratification of torture by public
officials when the public finds that the benefits of the torture have outweighed its
costs); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent CrisesAlways be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011 (2003); John T. Parry & Welsh S. White,
Interrogating Suspected Terrorists: Should Torture be an Option?, 63 U. PITT. L.
REV. 743 (2002) (rejecting the use of torture warrants but conceding that "[tihere
will, of course, be 'ticking bomb' hypotheticals in which an officer's decision to use
torture to obtain vital information would be viewed by everyone as the best choice
under the circumstances").
18. See generally TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sandford Levinson ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 2004); Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Editorial Comment,
Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 689 (2004); Antonio
Cassese, Are InternationalHuman Rights Treaties and Customary Rules on Torture
Binding Upon U.S. Troops in Iraq?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 872 (2004).
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A. INTERNATIONAL LAW
According to Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (I.C.J.), the primary sources of international
law are international conventions, customary international law,

and general principles of law recognized by states.'9 Judicial
decisions, along with the writings of highly qualified scholars,
are

considered

secondary

sources

of international

law.2 °

Customary international law has two components: the practice
should be widespread,2 1 and it should be accepted as law by
nearly all nation states. 22 A rule of customary international law
is binding upon all nations, except for those states that have
expressly and consistently rejected it since its inception.23
19. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59
Stat. 1031, 1978 Y.B.U.N. 1052 [hereinafter I.C.J]. The phrase "source of law" refers
to the particular rules, which constitute the system and the processes by which the
rules become identifiable as rules of law. Sources of international law comprise the
criteria under which a rule is accepted as valid in the international law system.
20. Id.
21. See PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (7th ed., Routledge 1997) (writing that a practice can be
widespread even if it is not "universally accepted" as customary international law
only requires that a practice be accepted among the states particularly involved in
the relevant activity); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (5th ed.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (explaining that a state's practice constitutes the
initial factor, but there are a number of other factors to be considered, such as the
practice's duration, consistency, repetition, and generality); see also Asylum Case
(Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266, at 276-77 (Nov. 20) (arguing that custom must be
in accordance with a uniform and constant usage); Military and Paramilitary
Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 98 (June 27) ("The Court does not
consider that, for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice
must be in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the
existence of customary rules, the Court deems it sufficient that the conduct of States
").
should, in general, be consistent with such rules ....
22. North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den; F.R.G. v. Neth), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
at 44 (Feb. 20) ("Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but
they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief
that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it ....The States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what
amounts to a legal obligation."); Lotus Case (Fr. v. Tur.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No.
10, at 28 (Sept. 7); MALANCZUK, supra note 21, at 44 ("State practice alone does not
suffice; it must be shown that it is accompanied by the conviction that it reflects a
legal obligation ....a conviction felt by the states that a certain form of conduct is
required by international law."); SHAw, supra note 21, at 80 ("The opinio juris, or
belief that a state activity is legally obligatory, is the factor which turns the usage
into a custom and renders it part of the rules of international law. To put it slightly
differently, states will behave in a certain way because they are convinced it is
binding upon them to do so.").
23. MALANCZUK, supra note 21, at 48; 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §10
(Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. Longman 1992).
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Furthermore, there is a set of international principles which are
binding upon all states without exception: jus cogens" rules, or
peremptory norms of general international law.25
1. Rules Governing Testimony and Evidence in the International
Court of Justice and Other Pre-InternationalCriminal Court
Tribunals
Article 49 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice provides: "the Court may, even before the hearing
begins, call upon the agents to produce any document or to
supply any explanation. " 6 The I.C.J. adopted its Rules of Court
in 1978 in order to codify the procedure of the Court in
contentious cases.27 The I.C.J. Rules are silent about testimonial privileges and confidentiality requirements concerning
disputes between states. Article 58 of the I.C.J. Rules, however,
allows the Court to determine the method of handling evidence
on a case-by-case basis after receiving the views of the parties.28
Neither the I.C.J. nor its predecessor, the Permanent Court of
International Justice, has so far ruled on the issue of preserving
professional secrecy in international law. 29
24. SHAW, supra note 21, at 98-100.
25. 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 23; Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 ("A treaty is void if, at
the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm
of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law
having the same character.").
26. I.C.J., supra note 19, art. 49.
27. I.C.J. Rules of Court (1978), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
ibasicdocumentslibasictext/ibasicrulesofcourt_20001205.html.
28. Id. arts. 58, 31. Article 58 provides:
The order in which the parties will be heard, the method of handling the
evidence and of examining any witnesses and experts, and the number of
counsel and advocates to be heard on behalf of each party, shall be settled
by the Court after the views of the parties have been ascertained in
accordance with Article 31 of these Rules.
Id. at art. 58. Article 31 provides: "In every case submitted to the Court, the
President shall ascertain the views of the parties with regard to questions of
procedure. For this purpose he shall summon the agents of the parties to meet him
as soon as possible after their appointment, and whenever necessary thereafter." Id.
art. 31.
29. DURWARD V. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 377
(1975). Article 64 of the I.C.J. Rules requires that each witness make a declaration
that he shall "speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth." I.C.J.
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International tribunals have undisputed power to ask for
production of evidence or to investigate the facts at issue.
Treaties establishing tribunals either specify the rules of
procedure and evidence or include provisions that allow the
tribunals to draft their own rules of procedure. 31 Ad hoc or
temporary tribunals generally lack specific rules of procedure,32
and a definitive body of rules of evidence in international law
has yet to be fully developed.33 The general tendency in international civil cases is to disregard restrictions on the admissibility of evidence, allocating to the presiding judge the duty of
weighing the evidence before him or her. Since it is usually
very difficult for international tribunals to obtain and prepare
evidence, they tend to admit any evidence submitted to the
tribunal.3 5 International criminal tribunals have more restrictive rules on admissibility of evidence than international civil
courts or international arbitration institutions. To determine
whether an evidentiary rule applies before an international
tribunal, both the particular rules of evidence adopted by the
tribunal and the tribunal's application of its rules in previous
cases must be considered.36
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Rules of Court, supra note 27, art. 64; see also V. S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 231 (1980) (suggesting that this declaration
does not obligate a witness to violate professional secrecy).
30. MOJTABA KAZAZI, BURDEN OF PROOF AND RELATED ISSUES: A STUDY ON
EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 165 (1996).
31. See, e.g., I.C.J., supranote 19, art. 30.
32. SANDIFER, supra note 29, at 8, 41-44 (explaining that international
tribunals usually have the power to determine their procedure, including rules of
evidence, privileges, and duties of the litigants; but international tribunals have no
authority in dealing with evidence that goes beyond the provisions of the
agreements creating them and the rules adopted in pursuance thereof).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 4-9 (writing that international tribunals are most concerned with the
facts of the question presented and therefore more intolerant of any restriction on
their acquisition of such information). Because international disputes involve states
rather than individuals, tribunals' decisions often have more far-reaching effects
than litigation. Id. Tribunals are usually more reluctant to rely on formal and
technical rules of evidence. Id. They generally insist on their right to seek the truth
wherever it may be found. Id.
35. Cf. David Weissbrodt & James McCarthy, Fact Finding by International
Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 64-66 (1981)
(writing that problems of access to facts encountered by NGOs are similar to
problems faced by international tribunals).
36. See, e.g., International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Rules of Procedure
and Evidence, Rule 89, available at http://www.ictr.orgENGLISH/rules/ 240404/
240404.pdf [hereinafter ICTR Rules] ("The rules of evidence set forth in this Section
shall govern the proceedings before the Chambers.").
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) sheds some light on the evidentiary rules of
international tribunals. On May 24, 1993, the United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council established an ad hoc international
criminal tribunal to prosecute those persons "responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed
in the territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991." 37 Article 15 of
the statute establishing the ICTY states that "the judges of the
International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and
evidence."38
The ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
contain several rules relating to non-disclosure of certain
information and protection of witnesses. 39 Rule 53(A) states that
"[in exceptional circumstances, a Judge or a Trial Chamber
may, in the interests of justice, order the non-disclosure to the
public of any documents or information until further order."0
Rule 70(d) provides, "If the Prosecutor calls a witness to
introduce in evidence any information provided under this Rule,
the Trial Chamber may not compel that witness to answer any
question relating to the information or its origin, if the witness
declines to answer on grounds of confidentiality."4 Moreover,
Rule 97 of the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence
expressly recognizes a lawyer-client privilege.42
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) did
not provide for a specific rule relating to a physician-patient
privilege. The attorney-client privilege is the only privilege
37. S.C. Res. 827, 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).
38. Statute of the International Tribunal art. 15, May 3, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159.
39. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev.36, available at http://www.un.orgicty/legaldoce/index.htm [hereinafter ICTY Rules]; see e.g. id. Rule 33.
40. Id. at Rule 53(A).
41. Id. at Rule 70(D) (emphasis added).
Moreover, Rule 69(A) provides
safeguards for the protection of witnesses: "In exceptional circumstances, the
Prosecutor may apply to a Judge or Trial Chamber to order the non-disclosure of the
identity of a victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such person is
brought under the protection of the Tribunal." Id. at Rule 69(A).
42. Id. at Rule 97 ("All communications between lawyer and client shall be
regarded as privileged, and consequently not subject to disclosure at trial, unless: (i)
the client consents to such disclosure; or (ii) the client has voluntarily disclosed the
content of the communication to a third party, and that third party then gives
evidence of that disclosure."). In drafting the ICTY Rules of Evidence, privileges
recognized by other systems were given consideration. See 1 VIRGINIA MORRIS &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 574
(1998). Initially, the attorney-client privilege was the only one recognized. Id. A
witness could still be relieved of the duty to testify when justified by the
fundamental considerations underlying other privileges or if the Rules were
amended. Id. A witness who refused to testify had to be left the opportunity to raise
a privilege. Id.
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recognized in the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence.4 3 Rule
89(C) allows the chamber to "admit any relevant evidence which
it deems to have probative value." 4 Though relevant and
probative evidence may be admitted, the ICTR cannot force a
witness to answer questions when "the witness declines to
answer on the grounds of confidentiality." '
In Prosecutor v. Simic, the ICTY decided that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could claim a
testimonial privilege concerning testimony by a former
employee on facts that came to his knowledge by virtue of his
employment with the ICRC.48 The ICTY stressed the fact that
confidentiality was necessary for the effective discharge of the
ICRC's humanitarian functions, and furthermore, state practice
and the ICTY have recognized the ICRC's practices concerning
confidentiality. 7 The ICTY mentioned the ICRC's pivotal role in
the observance of humanitarian standards and stated that due
to widespread international acceptance of the Geneva
Conventions, the ICRC's right to confidentiality has become
customary international law.4 s Despite the fact that the former
43. ICTR Rules, supra note 36, at Rule 97.
44. Id. at Rule 89(C).
45. Id. at Rule 70(D).
46. Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Ex Parte Confidential Decision on
the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of a
Witness, 1 1 (July 27, 1999) ("The Prosecution describes the witness as an eyewitness who, as a former ICRC interpreter, accompanied ICRC staff on visits to
places of detention and during exchanges of civilians supervised by the ICRC. The
witness was interviewed by the Prosecution's investigators on facts that came to his
knowledge by virtue of his employment.").
47. Id.
55-57 ("The principle of confidentiality, on which the ICRC relies,
refers to its practice not to disclose to third parties information that comes to the
knowledge of its personnel in the performance of their functions. The ICRC argues
that this principle is a key element on which it needs to rely in order to be able to
carry out its mandate. It has been described as a 'working tool.'").
48. Id.
73-74 ('The parties to the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols
have assumed a conventional obligation to ensure non-disclosure in judicial
proceedings of information relating to the work of the ICRC in the possession of an
ICRC employee, and that, conversely, the ICRC has a right to insist on such nondisclosure by parties to the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols. In that regard,
the parties must be taken as having accepted the fundamental principles on which
the ICRC operates, that is impartiality, neutrality and confidentiality, and in
particular as having accepted that confidentiality is necessary for the effective
performance by the ICRC of its functions.
The ratification of the Geneva
Conventions by 188 States can be considered as reflecting the opinio juris of these
State Parties, which, in addition to the general practice of States in relation to the
ICRC as described above, leads the Trial Chamber to conclude that the ICRC has a
right under customary international law to non-disclosure of the Information."
(footnote omitted)).
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employee was willing to testify as to information gathered, the
ICTY held that the testimony was inadmissible due to the
confidentiality interests of the ICRC. It was the ICRC, not the
former employee, who was the holder of the privilege.4 9 The
ICTY's Trial Chamber has also recognized testimonial privileges

for employees and functionaries of the ICTY, as well as for the
Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Protection Force. 50
In 2002, the ICTY's Appeals Chamber recognized a
qualified testimonial privilege for journalists and war
correspondents in a case that attracted wide public attention. 5'
The decision concerned a subpoena to testify before the ICTY

that was issued to a journalist who interviewed one of the
accused persons, and later published the interview in the
Washington Post.52
The Prosecutor sought the journalist's

testimony on the ground that no privilege attached concerning
published materials and openly identified sources; the
journalist, meanwhile, contested the subpoena, arguing that to
compel journalists to testify might hinder their ability to obtain
information and inform the public.53
The Appeals Chamber determined that compelling war

correspondents to testify might hamper their ability to inform
the public.54 If journalists were to be compelled to serve as
witnesses, interviewed persons might speak less freely or
honestly. Moreover, war correspondents might not only be

observers of human rights abuses, but may become victims of
human rights abuses themselves. 5 The ICTY decision qualified
49. Id.
50. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion Ex Parte
by the Defence of Zdravko Mucic Concerning the Issue of a Subpoena to an
Interpreter (July 8, 1997); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision of
Trial Chamber I on Protective Measures for General Philippe Morillon, Witness of
the Trial Chamber (May 12, 1999).
51. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Case No. IT-99-36-AR73.9, Decision on
Interlocutory Appeal, T 50 (Dec. 11, 2002).
52. Id.
3.
53. Id.
4.
54. Id. The Appeals Chamber first determined that there was a public interest
in the work of war correspondents since vigorous press was essential to the
functioning of open societies. The Chamber also argued that society's interest in
protecting the integrity of the newsgathering process was particularly clear in the
case of war correspondents because the transmission of vital information was
essential to keeping the international public informed about matters of life and
death and to assisting those who would prevent or punish the crimes under
international humanitarian law that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICTY. Id.
55. Id. (recognizing the journalist testimonial privilege concerning confidential
information and stating that many national courts have held that journalists
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the privilege by imposing a two-pronged test for compelling a
journalist to testify: the prosecutor must demonstrate that (1)
the evidence sought is of direct and important value in
determining a core issue in the case and (2) that the evidence
sought cannot reasonably be obtained elsewhere. 56
It is
important to note that the case concerned a subpoena about
non-confidential information (that was already made public) and
that the testimonial privilege universally enjoyed by journalists
concerning confidential information raises even more serious
concerns as to the protection of the role of the journalist."7
2. The InternationalCriminal Court
In 1994, the International Law Commission presented a
Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court to the U.N.
General Assembly. 58 On July 17, 1998, the U.N. Diplomatic
Conference voted to establish the International Criminal Court
(ICC), a permanent international court empowered to prosecute
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.59 In 1998,
the Rome Conference established a Preparatory Commission,
which adopted the Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICC
on June 30, 2000.60 The Rome Statute establishing the ICC
entered into force on July 1, 2002, and the ICC began work in
April 2003, after the election of its first chief-prosecutor.
Although the ICC has not yet brought any charges, its statute
has been accepted by ninety-seven nations and it is
enjoyed testimonial privilege concerning confidential information and had a right to
refuse subpoenas concerning such information (referring to Contempt of Court Act,
1981, § 10 (Eng.); C. PR. PtN. 109 (Fr.); C.P.P. 200(2) (Italy); StPO 53 (F.R.G.);
United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181-82 (1st Cir. 1988);
United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147-48 (3rd Cir. 1980)).
56. Id.
57. But see Reporter Sentenced to 6 months of Home Confinement for Refusing
to Reveal his Source, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, Sept. 12, 2004,
http://www.rsf.org/print.php3?idarticle=12055 (discussing the case of a journalist
sentenced by a federal court in Rhode Island to six months home confinement for
refusing to reveal his source even after the source came forward).
58. DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY,
AND PROCESS 418 (3d ed. 2001) ("[The U.N.] General Assembly established an ad hoc
committee to review the major substantive and procedural issues arising in the draft
statute.... [Iun summer 1998, diplomats representing over 150 countries convened
in Rome to finalize a treaty to establish a permanent international criminal court.").
59. Id.
60. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 64(1), July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9, availableat http://www.un.org/law/icc/statutel
romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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investigating incidents in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
and Uganda. 1 Article 64 of the Rome Statute states that "the
functions and powers of the Trial Chamber set out in this article
shall be exercised in accordance with this Statute and the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence." 2 Furthermore, Article 69(5) states
that "the Court shall respect and observe privileges on
confidentiality as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence."6 3
Rule 73(3) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
ICC expressly recognizes the confidentiality of communications
between victims and their doctors, establishing both physicianpatient and psychiatrist-patient privileges.64
Rule 73(2)
provides the criteria for recognizing a testimonial privilege, and
Rule 82(3) reiterates that the ICC's Trial Chamber may not
compel a person to testify about a privileged communication. 5

Similar to the ICTY's and ICTR's rules, the ICC Rules of
Evidence have elaborate rules concerning protection of victims
and witnesses, including specific measures to protect their
61. International Criminal Court, Situations and Cases, http'//www.icccpi.intlcases.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2005).
62. Rome Statute, supra note 60, art. 64.
63. Id. art. 69(5).
64. Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, Rule
73(3), availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/
basicdocuments/rules(e).pdf [hereinafter ICC Rules]. Rule 73(3) provides:
In making a decision under sub-rule 2, the Court shall give particular
regard to recognizing as privileged those communications made in the
context of the professional relationship between a person and his or her
medical doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist or counsellor, in particular those
related to or involving victims, or between a person and a member of a
religious clergy; and in the latter case, the Court shall recognize as
privileged those communications made in the context of a sacred confession
where it is an integral part of the practice of that religion.
Id.
65.

Id. Rule 73(2), 82(3). Rule 73(2) states that:

[C]ommunications made in the context of a class of professional or other
confidential relationships shall be regarded as privileged, and consequently
not subject to disclosure ... if a Chamber decides in respect of that class
that: (a) Communications occurring within that class of relationship are
made in the course of a confidential relationship producing a reasonable
expectation of privacy and non-disclosure; (b) Confidentiality is essential to
the nature and type of relationship between the person and the confidant;
and (c) Recognition of the privilege would further the objectives of the
Statute and the Rules.
Id. Rule 82(3) states that "[ilf the Prosecutor calls a witness to introduce in evidence
any material or information which has been protected... a Chamber may not
compel that witness to answer any question relating to the material or information
or its origin, if the witness declines to answer on grounds of confidentiality." Id.
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identities and the establishment of the Victims and Witnesses
Unit to provide security arrangements.
3. The European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights
The Rules of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR)
are silent concerning privileges, though Rule 42 states that the
court is capable of compelling a witness to testify to facts helpful
for deciding the case.66 The European Court of Justice has
encountered physician-patient confidentiality on one occasion
and declined to compel the doctor to testify as to his or her
private communications with patients.6 7 Similar to the ECHR's
Rules, the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights (IACtHR) do not mention any privilege or any
rule concerning the inadmissibility of evidence on confidentiality
grounds. 8 Article 34 of the Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR is
similar to the ECHR's Rule 42 in that 69it admits any evidence
helpful in clarifying the facts of the case.

H.R.
Ct.
Eur.
of Court,
66. Rules
http://www.echr.coe.intlechr/. Rule Al provides:

51

(2005),

available

at

The Chamber may, at the request of a party or of its own motion, adopt any
investigative measure which it considers capable of clarifying the facts of
the case. The Chamber may, inter alia, invite the parties to produce
documentary evidence and decide to hear as a witness or expert or in any
other capacity any person whose evidence or statements seem likely to
assist it in carrying out its tasks.
Id.
67. Case 155/78, Miss. M. v. Comm'n, 1980 E.C.R. 1797, 1811 ("[Tlhe court
requested the Commission to draw up a study of comparative law on the question of
the confidentiality of medical findings under the laws of the various Member States
of the Community. It appears from that study that.., it is true that in all the
Member States such confidentiality is protected because of the confidential
relationship which is formed between the patient seeking treatment and the
doctor .... In these circumstances the refusal to give any information ... and the
reliance, by the doctors in the confidence of the Commission, on the confidentiality of
medical findings as grounds for refusing to provide any useful indication has the
result of making it impossible for the court to carry out the judicial review . . ").
68. Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7 at 18
(1992).
69. Id., art. 34(1), (2). Article 34(1) states:
The Court may, at the request of a party or on its own motion, obtain any
evidence which it considers likely to clarify the facts of the case .... [Ilt
may decide to hear as a witness or expert witness, or in any other capacity,
any person whose evidence, statements or opinion it deems useful.
Id. art. 34(1). Article 34(2) gives the Court the authority to "request the parties to
provide any type of evidence available to them or any explanation or statement that,
in its judgment, would be likely to clarify the facts of the case." Id. art. 34(2).
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4. The ConfidentialNature of Patient-Physician
Communications Under Customary InternationalLaw
There is no treaty concerning confidentiality
of
communications between doctors and patients.0 Nor apparently have general principles of law been delineated concerning
confidentiality of communications between doctors and
patients." In the absence of these sources it is necessary to look
at international custom to determine whether communications
between doctors and patients are confidential under international law. Evidence of widespread state practice together
with international organizations' practices may reflect a
customary rule concerning the confidentiality of doctor-patient
communications.
The World Medical Association (WMA), an international
organization representing physicians from over seventy countries, adopted the Declaration on the Rights of the Patient,
which states, "[a]ll identifiable information about a patient's
health status, medical condition, diagnosis, prognosis and
treatment and all other information of a personal kind, must be
kept confidential, even after death."72 The World Psychiatric
Association, with 37,000 U.S. and international member

70. None of the leading indexes to treaties include entries for medical
confidentiality, physician-patient privilege, or related concepts. See M.J. BOWMAN &
D.J. HARRIS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES: INDEX AND CURRENT STATUS 492-615 (1984);
II A GUIDE TO THE U.S. TREATIES IN FORCE 159-800 (Igor I. Kavass ed., 2004); U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2004
iii-vii (2004); Scott Barrett, Summary of Remarks, Shifting Norms in International
Health Law, 98 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROc. 13, 13 (2004) (stating that, prior to the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the World Health Organization
had not used international agreements to promote health-related goals). A keyword
search of the vast United Nations Treaty Database, http://untreaty.un.org/
English/access.asp, also fails to yield treaties on these concepts (Treaty Series
database searched Sept. 12, 2005).
71. See Robert John Araujo, Essay, International Tribunals and Rules of
Evidence: The Case for Respecting and Preserving the "Priest-Penitent"Privilege
under InternationalLaw, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 639, 661-62 (2000) (citing only to
proposed draft rules when discussing general international law principles on
confidentiality of information gained during particular relationships); Geoffrey
Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, TransnationalRules of Civil Procedure: Rules and
Commentary, 30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493 (1997); Krysten Hicks, Comment,
Thresholds for Confidentiality: The Need for Articulate Guidance in Determining
When to Breach Confidentiality to Prevent Third-PartyHarm, 17 TRANSNAT'L LAW.
295 (2004).
72. The World Medical Association, Declaration on the Rights of the Patient
(Sept. 2005), http'/www.wma.nette/policy/14.htm.
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psychiatrists, reiterated the confidentiality requirements in its
Declaration of Madrid in 1996. 7' The Council for International
Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS), an international,
nongovernmental organization established jointly by the World
Health Organization (WHO) and U.N. Education Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 1949, adopted its
International Ethical Guidelines in 2002. 74 Guideline 18's
Comment expressly provides a doctor-patient confidentiality
rule.75
This section looks first at the promotion and protection of
international tribunals and is followed by examples of national
protections from the U.S. federal courts. In 1982, the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the Principles of Medical Ethics."6
The Principles of Medical Ethics address doctors' participation
in torture sessions but do not mention confidentiality

73. World Psychiatric Association, Declaration of Madrid (Aug. 25, 1996),
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/madrid1996.html ("Information obtained in
the therapeutic relationship should be kept in confidence and used, only and
exclusively, for the purpose of improving the mental health of the patient.
Psychiatrists are prohibited from making use of such information for personal
reasons, or financial or academic benefits. Breach of confidentially may only be
appropriate when serious physical or mental harm to the patient or to the third
person could ensue if confidentiality were maintained; in these circumstances,
psychiatrists should whenever possible, first advise the patient about the action to
be taken.").
74. Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, What is
CIOMS?, http://www.cioms.chlframe-what-iscioms.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2005)
("CIOMS is representative of a substantial proportion of the biomedical scientific
community. The membership of CIOMS in 2003 includes 48 international member
organizations, representing many of the biomedical disciplines, and 18 national
members mainly representing national academies of sciences and medical research
councils ....
Specific reference should be made to the International Ethical
Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects (developed in
conjunction with WHO), which superseded Proposed Ethical Guidelines (1982) and
were published in 1993 [and again in 2002]. They have been very widely utilized,
particularly in low-income countries ..
").

75.

COUNCIL FOR

INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS

OF

MEDICAL SCIENCES,

INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING
HUMAN SUBJECTS § 18 (3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.cioms.ch/
frame.guidelines-nov 2002.htm ("Patients have the right to expect that their
physicians and other health-care professionals will hold all information about them
in strict confidence and disclose it only to those who need, or have a legal right to,
the information, such as other attending physicians, nurses, or other health-care
workers who perform tasks related to the diagnosis and treatment of patients. A
treating physician should not disclose any identifying information about patients to
an investigator unless each patient has given consent to such disclosure and unless
an ethical review committee has approved such disclosure.").
76. G.A. Res. 37/194, U.N. Doc. AIRES/37/194 (Dec. 18, 1983).
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requirements.
The ICRC views communications between
ICRC's employees (including its physicians) and victims as
confidential in nature.7 s Nonetheless, the ICRC discloses confidential information to third parties when it is necessary for the
benefit of threatened persons and when the ICRC is certain
human rights are being violated.79
5. The Admissibility of HearsayEvidence in an International
Court

Hearsay evidence rules ban witnesses from testifying about
out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in such statements. In court systems with hearsay
evidence rules doctors may be precluded from testifying about
statements made to them by patients.
International courts usually admit hearsay evidence."' The
hearsay rule is characteristic of common law systems. In civil

77. Id.
78. See Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Ex Parte Confidential Decision
on the Prosecution Motion Under Rule 73 for a Ruling Concerning the Testimony of
a Witness,
1 (July 27, 1999); Gabor Rona, The ICRC Privilege Not to Testify:
Confidentiality in Action, 845 INT'L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 207, 211 (2002).
79. David Weissbrodt, The Role of International Organizations in the
Implementation of Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw in Situations of Armed
Conflict, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 313, 347-48 (1988) ("While the ICRC's efforts to
end violations of international humanitarian law or to prevent such violations are in
principle confidential, the ICRC takes a different approach when necessary. The
ICRC reserves the right to publicly denounce violations of international
humanitarian law when the violations are significant, confidential efforts have not
ended the violations, public statements will benefit the threatened persons, and
ICRC delegates witnessed the violations or otherwise verified the existence of the
violations through reliable sources.").
80. See infra notes 169-180 (discussing several exceptions to the hearsay
evidence rule that may allow doctors to testify as to certain statements made by
their patients).
81. See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARv. L. REV. 1842, 1990 n.60 (2001) ("Other departures
from typical domestic procedural rights may also be justifiable as targeted attempts
to address the factual and legal obstacles specific to international prosecution. For
example, commentators have criticized both the ICTY and the ICTR for their broad
admission of oral hearsay evidence."); Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in
International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, the Hague and Arusha, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 725, 745 (1999) ("A significant practice of all the
international tribunals is their refusal to be hindered by a technical approach to the
admission of evidence in their search for the truth. This is best illustrated by their
approach to hearsay evidence .... Hearsay is usually inadmissible in common law
systems, but was readily admitted in the Nuremberg and Japanese trials, both in
oral evidence and in the form of affidavits.").
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law systems, where there is no jury and the judge conducts the
fact-finding process, out-of-court statements are usually
admitted when relevant. International criminal courts have
borrowed their rules of evidence from both common law and civil
law systems, but usually favor admissibility of all evidence.
The ICTY, for example, has admitted hearsay evidence on
the theory that the ICTY's professional judges will, unlike a lay
jury, be able to assess and discount the irrelevant evidence. 2 In
trials before the ICTY, testimony containing hearsay is
admissible, provided that the evidence is probative and
relevant 3 Similarly, the ICTR has admitted testimony of a
witness describing an out-of-court statement of an alleged
perpetrator. 4 The Rules of Procedure for the ICC are not very
clear on the admissibility of hearsay, and consequently, judges
are given wide discretion in admitting any relevant evidence. 5
82. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion on
Hearsay, TT 14, 19 (Aug. 5, 1996), reprinted in 2 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL
ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL COURTS (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia Swaak-Goldman eds.,
2000) ("The International Tribunal, with its unique amalgam of civil and common
law features, does not strictly follow the procedure of civil law or common law
jurisdictions.... Accordingly, in deciding whether or not hearsay evidence that has
been objected to will be excluded, the Trial Chamber will determine whether the
preferred evidence is relevant and has probative value focusing on its reliability.");
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBURG 108-09 09 (1997) (explaining
that in the 1996 trial of Dusko Tadic before the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, hearsay evidence was permitted, and several witnesses were
allowed to give evidence on an anonymous basis); see also Christian DeFrancia, Due
Process in InternationalCriminal Courts: Why Procedure Matters, 87 VA. L. REV.
1381, 1426 (2001) ("[J]udges of the Yugoslav Tribunal determined that under Subrule 89(C), they would admit hearsay evidence in order to obtain as much material
as possible to understand the circumstances surrounding a case."); Lee A. Casey,
The Case Against The International Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 840,
869 (2002).
83. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on the Motion of
16 (Jan. 19, 1998) ("The approach
Prosecution for Admissibility of Evidence,
adopted by the Rules is clearly one in favour of admissibility as long as the evidence
is relevant and is deemed to have probative value. .. ").
84. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 21 (Sept. 2, 1998); MORRIS
& SCHARF, supra note 42, at 566 ("While hearsay may thus be admissible, the Trial
Chamber [of the ICTR] is required to exclude relevant evidence notwithstanding its
probative value if it was 'obtained by methods which cast doubt on its reliability...'
under Rule 95."); see also Kellye L. Fabian, Proofand Consequences: An Analysis of
the Tadic and Akayesu Trials, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 981, 1019-21 (2000).
85. ICC Rules, supra note 64, at Rule 63(2); see also Defrancia, supra note 82,
at 1402 ("The current Draft Rules of Evidence and Procedure of the proposed ICC
reveal little in the way of indicators as to the models for admissibility of
evidence.... Although the Rome Statute articulates strong norms for the rights of
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The ICC's Rules are largely modeled after the Rules of Evidence
of the ICTY and the ICTR, and the ICC's Rules do not include a
rule forbidding admissibility of hearsay evidence.86 Similarly,
the European Court of Human Rights admits any kind of
evidence without restriction.87
B. CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
THE UNITED STATES

Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs
privileges in U.S. federal courts. Rule 501 does not codify a list
of specific privileges, but provides that privileges "shall be
governed by the principles of common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason
and experience."88 Through Rule 501 Congress has allowed the
courts to continue the evolutionary development of privileges.89

Federal courts have often referred to the common law in order to
determine whether a privilege should be applied in a particular
90
case.

the accused, the wide-ranging discretion afforded judges in their decisions on the
admissibility of evidence is worrisome. Without more specific provisions restricting
the admission of hearsay evidence, the evidentiary bases upon which convictions are
obtained run the risk of being unclear. In the absence of more specific evidentiary
provisions, however, the developing jurisprudence at the ad hoc Tribunals is the
proper starting point for drawing up rules of thumb for the enhancement of
procedural protections in the future court.").
86. Fabian, supra note 84, at 1038-39 ("[SIome variant on the hearsay rules in
the Federal Rules of Evidence should be employed by the judges to at least limit the
situations in which hearsay is admitted. For example, hearsay evidence could be
admissible where a Commission of Experts has been appointed to conduct interviews
of victims and witnesses. The rule would allow a qualified expert who had actually
conducted interviews to testify about the general feelings of the victims and the
witnesses, but not about specific criminal acts of the accused. The changes
suggested are not significant ones, yet are nonetheless critical to avoid serious
evidentiary problems and ensure the effectiveness of the ICC.").
87. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 79 (1978) ("The
Court is not bound, under the Convention or under the general principles applicable
to international tribunals, by strict rules of evidence. In order to satisfy itself, the
Court is entitled to rely on evidence of any kind ...
88.
89.

FED. R. EVID. 501.
FED. R. EVID. 501 advisory committee's note ('The Committee... leftthe

law of privileges in its present state and further provided that privileges shall
continue to be developed by the courts of the United States under a uniform
standard applicable both in civil and criminal cases.")
90. See, e.g., Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 383 (1933); Wolfle v. United
States, 291 U.S. 7, 12 (1934); United States v. Meagher, 531 F.2d 752, 753 (5th Cir.
1976).

2006]

PIERCING THE CONFIDENTIALITY VEIL

1. The Physician-PatientPrivilege
The physician-patient privilege did not exist at common
law. 9 Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that privileges are governed by common law in the
absence of a federal statute.92 Because there is no federal statute
governing a physician-patient privilege, there is no physicianThe second
patient privilege in federal criminal cases. 9
sentence of Rule 501 provides that "in civil actions ...with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege.. . shall be
determined in accordance with State law."94 Consequently, in
civil diversity actions, the relevant state law determines if the
physician-patient privilege applies with respect to an element of
a claim or defense. 95 In 1828, New York became the first state to
enact a statutory provision recognizing a physician-patient
privilege.99 Today, about three-fourths of the states have a law
recognizing some form of physician-patient privilege with
significant variations and numerous exceptions.97 Less than ten
states lack a statute recognizing any form of the physicianpatient privilege.99
91. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 479 (3d ed.
1996) (stating that the physician-patient privilege is a creature of statute); 1 DAVID
W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 182 (1977); JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 504-09 (1996); 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw 818-19 (John T. McNaughton rev. 1961); see
also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 n.28 (1977) (noting that there was no common
law evidentiary privilege).
92. WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 504-11.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 970 F.2d 48, 50 (5th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Bercier, 848 F.2d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Burzynski, 819
F.2d 1301, 1311 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 n.9
(11th Cir. 1983); Meagher, 531 F.2d at 753; United States v. Harper, 450 F.2d 1032,
1035 (5th Cir. 1971).
94. FED. R. EVID. 501.
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (stating that federal courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions between citizens of a state and citizens of a foreign
state).
96. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 91.
97. WEINSTEIN ET AL., supra note 91, at 504-09. The majority of states copied
the language of the 1974 Uniform Rules of Evidence 503, adopted by the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1974, which provided definitions of a
physician-patient priviledge and exceptions to the privilege. For the full text of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence on the physician-patient privilege, see LOUISELL &
MUELLER, supra note 91, at 595.
98. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 225 n.169
(4th ed. 2001). See ARTHUR BEST, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE 2004-2 CUMULATIVE
SUPPLEMENT § 2380, at 1336-49 (2005), for a complete listing of the state laws that
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Two theories provide justification for the physician-patient
privilege. 99 The first is that the privilege would foster candid
disclosure on behalf of the patient, which is essential for
diagnoses and treatment. 100 The second is that the privilege
serves a societal interest by preserving the privacy of intimate
communications as to one's physical condition. 0' But it is
generally understood that it is a doctor's duty of confidentiality,
assured by the medical code of ethics, which better serves to
preserve a patient's confidences rather than an evidentiary rule
concerning privileges.
Wigmore, in his treatise, criticized the
states that enacted the physician-patient privilege and argued
that the fundamental 03conditions for the establishment of such a
privilege were absent.
Even though particular state provisions may differ, the
extent and applicability of the physician-patient privilege in
most states can be summarized as follows: the privilege applies
when a patient consults a physician for diagnosis or treatment,
but does not apply when the patient consults the physician
solely for the purpose of litigation.0 4
In Missouri Pacific
Railway Co. v. Castle, the court stated that "[t]he privilege is
intended (and by most statutes is declared) to protect only those
communications which are necessary for obtaining the benefits
of the professional relation-in other words, for enabling the
physician to prescribe remedies or relief."'
Accordingly, the
have physician-patient privilege.
99. LILLY, supra note 91, at 479-80.

100.

Id.

101. Id. at 480.
102. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Privileged Communications: Is Justice Served or
Obstructed by Closing the Doctor's Mouth on the Witness Stand?, 52 YALE L.J. 607,
609-11 (1943); see infra Part II for the discussion of medical codes of ethics.
103. WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 829-30. Wigmore recognized four fundamental
conditions as necessary to the establishment of a privilege: (1) The communication
must originate in a confidence that it will not be disclosed; (2) The element of
confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the
relation between the parties; (3) The relation must be the one which in the opinion of
the community ought to be sedulously fostered; (4) The injury that would inure to
the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained by the correct disposal of litigation. Wigmore argued that the
first, second, and fourth conditions for establishing a privilege did not exist
concerning the physician-patient privilege, especially stressing the fact that the
number of people consulting doctors for their physical conditions did not increase
over the years after the first establishment of the physician-patient privilege in New
York in 1828. Id.
104. LILLY, supra note 91, at 480; LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 91, at 598.
105. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Castle, 172 F. 841, 845 (8th Cir. 1909)
(applying a Nebraska statute, the court found a statement by the patient with a
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physician must be consulted in his or her professional capacity;
only communications made at a time when the professional
relationship is engaged are privileged. 1 6 The privilege covers
not only communications between the patient and the physician,
but also matters observed by the physician during the course of
Similar to other privileges, the
treatment and diagnosis.
physician-patient privilege relates only to the communications
actually intended to be confidential. The presence of third
persons other than associated medical personnel and close
family destroys the privilege (except in the case of an
precautions were
eavesdropper or an interceptor, if reasonable
10 7
taken to ensure the confidentiality).
In all states that provide a physician-patient privilege, the
privilege belongs to the patient; the physician can only invoke
The privilege survives
the privilege on the patient's behalf.'
death and can be asserted by his or her
the patient's
• • 109Thpy
The physician cannot claim the privilege once
representative.
the patient has waived it. The filing of a suit to collect damages
for the physical or mental condition, testifying about the
privileged communication, or calling the treating physician to
the stand can all operate as a waiver of the privilege."0 There
are also some exceptions that limit the privilege's applicability.
For example, in all states that recognize the privilege, a general
crime-fraud exception exists concerning communications made
to perpetrate a fraud or crime."' Moreover, the privilege does
not prevent filing public reports or informing officials when the
concerned state law requires physicians to report certain
conditions such as gunshot or knife wounds, abuse of a child, or
abuse of an elderly or mentally disabled person." 2

crushed right leg was not privileged because it was not necessary for treatment);
Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22, 46 (D. Iowa 1948) (applying an Iowa
statute, the decedent's statement to his physician that he did not see the vehicle
which struck him was not privileged due to no pertinence to the treatment);
WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 842.
106. Ranger, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 196 F.2d 968, 972 (6th Cir.
1952) (applying the Michigan statute, the information obtained while socially
friendly with the patient and before the professional relationship existed was not
privileged).
107. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supranote 91, at 597.
108. WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 851.
109. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 91, at 597.
110. LILLY, supra note 91, at 484.
111. See WIGMORE, supra note 91, at 848; LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 91,
at 599-600.
112. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supranote 91, at 600.
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All states recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege,
including those that do not recognize a physician-patient
privilege. The unanimous acceptance of the psychiatrist-patient
privilege derives from the recognition that diagnosis and
treatment depend heavily on the patient's willingness to speak
frankly about his or her mental condition (as opposed to the
treatment of a physical condition in a physician-patient relationship). The Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond asserted that
while treatment for physical ailments can be successful through
physical examination alone, effective psychotherapy depends on
complete disclosure of the patient's emotions, fears, and
memories." 3 The Court held that the mere possibility of disclosure of these confidential communications to third parties might
impede treatment. 4 Scholars and judges have suggested that
an individual with physical ailments would likely consult a
physician regardless of confidentiality guarantees, while an
individual with mental-health problems may seek help exclusively where his or her confidences were guaranteed."" Similar
concerns are reflected in the
Advisory Note to the Proposed
6
Rules of Evidence Rule 504."
Jaffee v. Redmond is the seminal U.S. case regarding the
application of psychotherapist-patient privilege." 7 The case
concerns a police officer who shot a man and afterward received
extensive counseling from a licensed clinical social worker."'" At
trial, both the officer and the therapist refused to comply with a
113. See Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
114. See id.
115. See Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United
States ex rel. Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038, 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see also
WEINSTEIN, supra note 91, at 504-19.
116. Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973) ("Among physicians, the
psychiatrist has a special need to maintain confidentiality. His capacity to help
patients is completely dependent upon their willingness and ability to talk freely.
This makes it difficult if not impossible for him to function without being able to
insure his patients of confidentiality.").
Although the Proposed Rules about
privileges were rejected and deleted by the Congress in favor of the current Fed R.
Evid. 501, many courts have treated the Proposed Rules as persuasive evidence
concerning the content of federal law "in light of reason and experience." United
States v. Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 858 (C.D.N.Y. 1975) ("Despite their deletion by
Congress, the privilege rules promulgated by the Supreme Court remain of
considerable utility as standards. The specific Rules on privilege promulgated by
the Supreme Court are reflective of reason and experience."). Those deleted rules
are often referred to as "Standards." It is also significant to note that the Supreme
Court had approved the Proposed Rules (or Standards) by an eight to one vote and
transmitted them to Congress.
117. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 1.
118. See id. at 3-4.
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court order requiring them to reveal the contents of their
conversations." 9 The Supreme Court held that it was appropriate for the federal courts to recognize a psychotherapist privilege under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence because
fifty states and the District of Columbia have codified some form
of the psychotherapist privilege. 20 The Court determined that
the consensus among state legislatures reflected "reason and
experience," and that the privilege serves the public's interest as
well as the state's interest in its citizenry's mental health.12'
Moreover, the Supreme Court held that the privilege should be
extended not only to licensed psychotherapists but also to
Finally, the Court rejected any
licensed social workers. 22
balancing approach that would evaluate the patient's need for
privacy vis-&-vis the evidentiary need for disclosure, holding
that the privilege was absolute.'23
Following the Jaffee decision, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege has been read to include all communications made to
psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, and licensed social workers
providing therapeutic services. 24 Most of the states (more than
forty-three) recognize a "licensed social worker" privilege
independent of a psychotherapist-patient privilege.' 2' In 1999,
119. Id. at 5.
120. Id. at 12.
121. Id. at 13.
122. Id. at 15.
123. See id. at 17-18.
124. See Oleszko v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 243 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001)
(extending the psychotherapist-patient privilege to an unlicensed counselor); United
States v. Lowe, 948 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting that rape counseling
records are privileged in a majority of states and the District of Columbia, the court
held that a patient's communications with a rape counseling center are privileged).
But cf Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 793-94 (8th Cir. 1997)
(overturning an earlier district court opinion allowing a privilege for corporate
ombudsmen); United States v. Schwensow, 151 F.3d 650, 656-58 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that statements made to volunteer telephone operators at an Alcoholics
Anonymous office were not protected by the psychotherapist-patient privilege
because the volunteers did not hold themselves out as counselors, were not licensed,
and did not confer in a fashion resembling a psychotherapy session).
125. See Robert H. Aronson, The Mental Health ProviderPrivilege in the Wake of
Jaffe v. Redmond, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 591, 607 n.154 (2001). Minnesota's privilege
statute is typical. It provides:
A registered nurse, psychologist, consulting psychologist, or licensed social
worker engaged in a psychological or social assessment or treatment of an
individual at the individual's request shall not, without the consent of the
professional's client, be allowed to disclose any information or opinion
based thereon which the professional has acquired in attending the client
in a professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable the
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the Uniform Rules of Evidence were revised to reflect changes in
state laws 126 and to offer a general mental health provider
privilege which incorporates licensed social workers.'27
Communications with physicians may qualify for similar
protection if the physician stresses the psychosomatic aspects of
the patient's treatment.2 2 The Proposed Rule 504, which has
been influential in interpreting Rule 501, allowed the privilege
to be applied when the patient reasonably believed that the
physician was
a psychotherapist authorized to practice in that
29
jurisdiction.
2. Waiving the Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege
The psychotherapist-patient privilege applies to communications that serve the purpose of psycho-diagnosis or psychotherapy.'
Similar to the physician-patient privilege, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege belongs to the patient, and the
psychotherapist may claim the privilege on the patient's
behalf.13 ' The Proposed Rule 504 contained three exceptions, the
most important dealing with a case in which the protected
professional to act in that capacity.
MINN. STAT. § 595.02(g) (2004).
126. See Aronson, supra note 125, at 607.
127. Id. at 608 (explaining that most states define "social work" as "counseling of
clients to enhance or restore their capacity for physical, social and economic
functioning").
128. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 91, at 504-16 (writing that the legislative
history of the Proposed Rule 504 indicates that the definition of psychiatrist
included "a medical doctor engaged in the diagnosis and treatment of mental or
emotional conditions" in order not to exclude the general practitioner and to avoid a
needlessly refined definition concerning what is and what is not psychiatry).
129. See Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. 183, 242 (1973); see also Speaker ex rel.
Speaker v. County of San Bernardino, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1112-15 (C.D. Cal. 2000)
(holding that a client may invoke the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Rule
501 if he or she reasonably, but mistakenly, believes that he or she was being
counseled by a licensed psychologist or social worker). In 1972, the U.S. Supreme
Court transmitted to Congress the Proposed Rules of Evidence. The Proposed Rules,
which had been formulated by the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee and
approved by the Judicial Conference of the U.S., contained nine specific testimonial
privileges, including a psychotherapist-patient privilege. See FED. R. EVID. 501
House Judiciary Committee's report. Congress rejected the Proposed Rules in favor
of the current Rule 501's general mandate. See id.
130. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 91, at 607; see also Vanderbilt v.
Town of Chilmark, 174 F.R.D. 225, 230 (D. Mass. 1997) ("To clarify the scope of the
privilege, it is also important to note what it does not protect.... The substance of
the [psychotherapist-patient] communication is privileged. The fact that such
communication took place is not.").
131. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 91, at 607.
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information is an element of a claim or defense. 132 The rationale
for the exception is that it is inherently unfair for a party to rely
on a condition for a claim or defense, and at the same time
suppress the evidence relevant to that same condition. 33 The
privilege, however, is lost only to the extent necessary to expose
the truth of the mental condition at issue. The residual aspects
of the communication remain privileged.' 34
It is also important to note that the privilege may be lost
when its disclosure could prevent substantial risk of harm to
others. Although the Proposed Rule 504, later rejected by
Congress, did not include a crime-fraud exception, one federal
court applied the crime-fraud exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege when a patient allegedly defrauded lenders
and disability insurers. 3 ' When the communication's disclosure
is essential to avoid danger to others, courts have held that a
therapist is under a duty to warn and reveal relevant parts of
the communication. 136 The leading case on this issue is Tarasoff
v. Regents of University of California,in which the court found a
psychologist liable to the parents of a murder victim where the
murderer had confided to the psychologist his intentions to kill
the ViCtim.'
The California Supreme Court in Tarasoff stated
that even when the disclosure of confidential information is
necessary to prevent harm to others, the doctor must do so in a
manner that preserves
the privacy of his patient to the fullest
138
extent possible.

132. See Proposed Rule 504, 56 F.R.D. at 241 (allowing for exceptions to
privileged communication where a patient "relies upon the condition as an element
of his claim or defense").
133. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 91, at 504-34.
134. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 91, at 611.
135. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 1999).
136. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 189-91 (D. Neb.
1980); cf United States v. Hayes, 227 F.3d 578, 586 (6th Cir. 2000) (ruling that the
duty to protect third parties does not create a "dangerous-patient" exception to the
psychotherapist-patient evidentiary privilege in federal criminal proceedings).
137. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 551 P.2d 334, 351 (Cal. 1976).
138. Id. at 347. But see Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 734
(Cal. 1980) (narrowing Tarasoff by holding that the duty to warn depended on and
arose from the existence of a prior threat to an identifiable victim); Boynton v.
Burglass, 590 So.2d 446, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting Tarasoff and
holding that imposing a duty to warn on psychiatrists would not only be
unreasonable and unworkable but also a breach of the confidentiality of psychiatristpatient relationship). The Missouri Court of Appeals and the Supreme Courts of
Virginia and Texas have declined to follow Tarasoff in cases involving mental
patients harming third parties where psychiatrists have confidential information
concerning their patients' intentions. Matt v. Burrel, Inc., 892 S.W.2d 796, 800 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1995); Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Tex. 1999); Nasser v.

MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW

[Vol. 15:1

3. Confidential Communications vs. an Affirmative Duty to
Report Information
When a person accepts a physician's professional services
for the purposes of treatment, a physician-patient relationship
is established." 9 The fact that the physician renders services
gratuitously does not prevent the establishment of a confidential
relationship; it is sufficient that the patient entrusted himself or
herself to the physician's care.' 4 ' The original source of a physician's duty to maintain patients' confidences is the Hippocratic
Oath. 4 ' The pertinent portion of the Hippocratic Oath states:
"[w]hatever, in connection with my professional practice, or not
in connection with it, I see or hear, in the life of men, which
ought not to be spoken abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning
that all such should be kept secret."12 Court decisions and state

statutes have recognized the sanctity of the oath.'
Since
confidentiality rules are essentially ethical rules and standards
of conduct, the professional medical associations usually codify
and enforce such rules. The American Medical Association
(AMA) adopted a series of "Principles of Medical Ethics" on June
17, 2001.'4
Principle IV states that "a physician... shall
safeguard patient confidences and privacy within the
constraints of the law."'
Courts have referred to both the
Hippocratic Oath and the AMA Principles
as sources for a
146
common law duty of confidentiality.

The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA
regularly issues advisory opinions on ethical issues. In its
Opinion 5.05, the Council stated that "[t]he patient should feel
free to make a full disclosure of information to the physician in
order that the physician may most effectively provide needed
services. The physician should not reveal confidential communiParker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995).
139.

1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS

& HARVEY F.

WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE 24 (2d ed. 1992); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, What
Constitutes Physician-PatientRelationship for Malpractice Purposes, 17 A.L.R. 4th
132, 137 (1982).
140. PEGALIS & WACHSMAN, supra note 139.
141. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 148 (2d ed. 2000).
142. Id.
143.

EMANUEL HAYT & JONATHAN HAYT, LEGAL ASPECTS OF MEDICAL RECORDS

74 (1964).
144.

AM.

MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL

ETHICS (2001), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html.
145. Id.
146. FURROW ETAL., supra note 141, at 149.
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cations or information without the express consent of the
patient, unless required to do so by law.' 47
The confidentiality requirement, however, is not absolute.
In certain circumstances, disclosure of information is not a
breach of confidentiality. Several state public health statutes
require medical professionals to report a patient's medical
condition in situations involving venereal diseases; contagious
diseases; wounds inflicted by violence; poisonings; industrial
accidents; abortions; drug abuse; and abuse of children, elderly,
disabled, or others.
The Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the 49AMA also mentions a greater good that limits
confidentiality.
In circumstances that require reporting, the public interest
in disclosure overrides the interests of privacy and confidentiality. In situations involving child abuse or abuse of elderly persons, the reporting requirement's rationale stems from the
fact that abuse usually takes place in private places, and abused
people would not normally be in a position to come forward and
report the abuse. 5 ° Four-fifths of the states have some type of
147. AM. MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CONFIDENTIALITY (1994),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html.
148. FURROW ET AL., supra note 141, at 155; Phyllis Coleman, Creating
Therapist-IncestOffender Exception to Mandatory ChildAbuse Reporting StatutesWhen PsychiatristKnows Best, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1113, 1118 (1986) (stating that all
fifty states have statutes that mandate reporting cases of known or suspected child
abuse); Seymour Moskowitz, Saving Granny from the Wolf Elder Abuse and
Neglect--The Legal Framework, 31 CONN. L. REV. 77, 113 (1998) (stating that
legislators in forty-two states and the District of Columbia have enacted mandatory
reporting laws for elder abuse).
149. AM. MED. AS'N, supra note 147 ("The obligation to safeguard patient
confidences is subject to certain exceptions which are ethically and legally justified
because of overriding social considerations. Where a patient threatens to inflict
serious bodily harm to another person or to him or herself and there is a reasonable
probability that the patient may carry out the threat, the physician should take
reasonable precautions for the protection of the intended victim, including
notification of law enforcement authorities. Also, communicable diseases, gun shot
and knife wounds should be reported as required by applicable statutes or
ordinances.").
150. See Douglas J. Besharov, The Legal Aspects of Reporting Known and
Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect, 23 VILL. L. REV. 458, 464 (1978) (arguing that
while adult victims of abuse or other crimes can complain to the authorities, child
victims may receive protection only when a third person recognizes and reports the
danger); Cyril H. Wecht & Glenn M. Larkin, The Battered Child Syndrome-A
ForensicPathologist's Viewpoint, MED. TRIAL TECHNIQUE Q. 1, 2 (1982) (pointing out
that the state has historically been reluctant to intervene in child abuse situations
where the abuser is the parent); David P. Mathews, Comment, The Not-So-Golden
Years: The Legal Response to Elder Abuse, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 653, 662 (1988) (positing
that many abused elders do not come forward on their own and that only mandatory
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reporting requirements concerning gunshot wounds, knife
wounds, and serious burns. 5 ' Moreover, forty-five states now
have some sort of domestic violence reporting law concerning
spousal abuse cases.'52 Generally, the mandatory reporting
statutes require reporting of the name, age, sex, race, and
location of the injured person; the nature and the extent of the
harm; and in abuse cases, the identity of the perpetrator
information useful in establishing the
together with any 1other
53
cause of the abuse.
State mandatory reporting statutes have yet to mention
torture victims, and case law is silent about physicians' reporting requirements when dealing with torture victims. Nonetheless, it is significant to note that the United States ratified
the Torture Convention in 1994."5 The Torture Convention was
implemented by means of the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Article 2(1) of the Torture
Restructuring Act of 1998."5
Convention states, "each state party shall take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial and other measures to

reporting will help them).
151. See American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, Family Violence Statutes,
http://www.aaos.org/wordhtml/abuse/ststatut.htm (last visited on Jan. 14, 2005)
(listing states that lack such a requirement: Alabama, Connecticut, Indiana,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Washington,
and Wyoming). A typical example of the reporting requirement can be found in the
Minnesota statute regarding wounds. MINN. STAT. § 626.52 (2004) ("A health
professional shall immediately report.., to the local police department or county
sheriff all bullet wounds, gunshot wounds, powder burns, or any other injury arising
from, or caused by the discharge of any gun, pistol, or any other firearm, which
wound the health professional is called upon to treat, dress, or bandage. A health
professional shall report to the proper police authorities any wound that the reporter
has reasonable cause to believe has been inflicted on a perpetrator of a crime by a
dangerous weapon other than a firearm....").
152. James T. R. Jones, Battered Spouses Damage Action Against Non-Reporting
Physicians,45 DEPAUL L. REV. 191, 247 n. 289 (1996); see also Ariella Hyman et al.,
Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic Violence: Do They Promote Patient Wellbeing?, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1781, 1781-82 (1995); Alexi Nicole Vital, Mandatory
Reporting Statutes and the Violence Against Women Act: An Analytical Comparison,
10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 171, 179 n.59 (1999) ("The General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky recognizes that some adults of the Commonwealth are
unable to manage their own affairs or to protect themselves from abuse, neglect, or
exploitation. Often such persons cannot find others able or willing to render
assistance." (quoting KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 209.090 (LexisNexis 1997)).
153. Moskowitz, supra note 148, at 95; see also Kristine Cordier Karnezis,
Physician-PatientPrivilege as Applied to Physician's Testimony Concerning Wound
Required to be Reported to Public Authority, 85 A.L.R. 3d 1196 (1978).
154. Torture Convention, supra note 10.
155. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
112 Stat. 2681-761 (1998).

2006]

PIERCING THE CONFIDENTIALITY VEIL

prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction"
and article 4(1) states that "each state party shall ensure that
all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law."156 If
parties to this treaty are taking their obligations seriously to
prevent acts of torture, they should allow doctors to testify.
4. Breach of Patient-PhysicianConfidentiality and Resulting
DisciplinaryAction
Failing to assert a privilege on a patient's behalf and
testifying as to the substance of a privileged communication
gives rise to a breach of confidentiality, even if the doctor's
testimony was court-ordered. Courts have used four different
theories as a basis for actions for breach of confidentiality: 15 7 the
tort of invasion of privacy, 8 the tort of breach of a fiduciary
duty to maintain confidentiality,"' the violation of statutes
defining physician conduct,' 60 and the breach of an implied
contract. 6 ' When courts have awarded damages for a breach of
confidentiality, they usually find the breach of a fiduciary duty
rather than invasion of privacy or breach of an implied
contract.'62 This preference is largely because an invasion of
156. Torture Convention, supra note 10, arts. 2, 4. On December 10, 1984, the
United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the Torture Convention.
President Reagan signed the Torture Convention on April 18, 1988. One month
later, the President transmitted to the Senate the Torture Convention for approval
with nineteen proposed U.S. conditions. The Senate adopted its resolution of advice
and consent to ratification on October 27, 1990. 136 Cong. Rec. 36,198 (1990). On
October 21, 1994, President Clinton deposited the instrument of ratification with the
United Nations, and the Torture Convention entered into force for the United States
thirty days later. See Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2003).
157. Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1426, 1437 (1982); see also FURROW ET AL., supranote 141, at 151.
158. Home v. Patton, 287 So.2d 824, 830 (Ala. 1973); Clayman v. Bernstein, 38
Pa. D. & C. 543, 546 (Pa. D. & C. 1939).
159. MacDonald v. Clinger, 446 N.Y.S.2d 801, 804 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) ("[An
action in tort for a breach of a duty of confidentiality has long been acknowledged in
the courts of this state.... Ordinarily, the essence of a tort consists in the violation
of some duty due to an individual. When such duty grows out of relations of trust
and confidence.., the ground of the duty is apparent, and the tort is, in general,
easily separable from the mere breach of contract.").
160. Simonsen v. Swenson, 177 N.W. 831, 832 (Neb. 1920); Munzer v. Blaisdell,
49 N.Y.S.2d 915, 917-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944); Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 673
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977); Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 136 (S.D. 1974).
161. Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F.Supp. 793, 798 (N.D. Ohio
1965) (holding that, when a doctor treats a patient, a contract arises that implies
privacy).
162. See JOEL I. KLEIN ET AL., LEGAL ISSUES IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE OF
PSYCHIATRY 40 (1984).
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privacy requires public disclosure of private facts (as opposed to
disclosure to a small group) and damages for breach of contract
are limited to economic losses, omitting compensation for
In states where
emotional distress or loss of employment.16
courts have recognized a duty of confidentiality, breach of
confidentiality may serve as a basis for a malpractice suit or a
disciplinary action by his or her professional association. 6 4 A
breach of confidentiality may lead to admonishment, reprimand,
suspension, or expulsion from the American Psychiatric
Association. 6 5 Physicians can raise defenses to the allegation 1of
consent. 66
breach of confidentiality. One defense is a patient's
above, based on state mandatory
Another is, as mentioned
67
reporting requirements.1
5. Hearsayas a Bar to Identificationof Torturers Under the
FederalRules of Evidence
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801, any out-of-court
statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted is
generally hearsay and usually inadmissible as evidence. 6 The
hearsay rule has twenty-eight enumerated exceptions. 6 9 A
statement that is hearsay can be admitted under any of these
exceptions.
One exception is the "medical diagnosis exception," which
excludes from hearsay, "[s]tatements made for purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history,
or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment." 7' The rationale for the exception is that patients
seeking treatment are generally truthful about their conditions
so as to receive proper and effective treatment. 7 ' The U.S.

163. See id.
164. See RONALD JAY COHEN & WILLIAM E. MARIANO, LEGAL GUIDEBOOK IN
MENTAL HEALTH 260 (1982).
165. KLEIN ET AL., supra note 162, at 42.
166. See id. at 41.
167. See id. at 42.
168. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). But see FED. R. EVID. 801(d).
169. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804. A catch-all exception is also provided for in
Rule 807. FED. R. EVID. 807.
170. See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807.
171. FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
172. United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83-84 (8th Cir. 1980).
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Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit in United States. v. Iron
Shell devised a two-prong test for admissibility of statements
under the medical diagnosis exception: (1) the declarant's
motive must be consistent with the purpose of obtaining medical
treatment and (2) it must be reasonable for a physician to rely
on the statement in order to provide medical treatment or
diagnosis. 73 The medical diagnosis exception extends to statements related to causation but not ordinarily to fault.'74
Some federal courts admit child abuse victims' statements
that identify the alleged sexual or physical perpetrator when the
statements are made to a medical provider.'17 One federal court
admitted into evidence an estranged wife's statement that her
husband had raped her, under the medical diagnosis exception. 176 The general trend in federal courts is to admit the
identifying statements only when the abuser is a member of the
immediate household or closely related to the abused person,
based on the rationale that this is the only time when the
identity 1 of an abuser is pertinent to the treatment of the
patient. 77
Another exception is the excited utterance exception, which
includes "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement

173. Id. at 84.
174. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
175. See United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1995) (permitting
identifying statements when the abuser is related to the child and the abuser's
identity becomes reasonably pertinent to the victim's proper treatment); United
States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (permitting identifying
statements made to medical personnel even if the abuser is not related to the child
but lives in the immediate vicinity); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438
(8th Cir. 1985) (permitting identifying statements under the medical diagnosis
exception if the alleged abuser is a member of the child-victim's immediate
household, because such statements are reasonably pertinent to treatment). But see
United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 1979) (permitting the physician
to testify only to those portions of the child's statements that were relevant to the
cause of the injury and excluding the identifying statement); Robert R. Rugani, Jr.,
The GradualDecline of a Hearsay Exception: The Misapplicationof Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(4), the Medical DiagnosisHearsay Exception, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
867, 879 (1999) (arguing that expanding the medical diagnosis exception to cover the
identity of the abuser is contrary to the purpose of the exception because identifying
statements are not always inherently trustworthy).
176. United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1993) (permitting
states of identification under the medical diagnosis exception when the abuser has
such an intimate relationship with the victim that identity is "reasonably pertinent"
to medical treatment).
177. See Rugani, supra note 175, at 884.
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caused by the event or condition."" 8 The rationale for this
exception is that a startling event temporarily stills the capacity
for reflection and prevents fabrication for a short period of
time. 79 The excited utterance exception does not specify how
long the stress must last for the statement to be admissible
under the exception. The exception and the Advisory Committee seem to favor a case-by-case analysis. 8 ' Statements
made by a victim or observer of an act of torture might be
admitted under the excited utterance exception provided the
declarant was found to still be under the stress of the act.
C. THE FRENCH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ITS TREATMENT
OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVILEGE

Under French law, a physician is required by the medical
profession's ethical codes, and by law, to maintain a patient's
confidentiality, the breach of which amounts to a criminal
offense. The Medical Code of Ethics treats confidentiality as a
medical provider's sacred obligation to his or her patients."'
Article 4 mandates that physician-patient confidentiality
includes not only direct communications between the patient
and physician, but everything the medical professional hears,
observes, or learns." 2 French law prohibits the disclosure of
confidential information generally, but there are exceptions in
particular circumstances.
Disclosure of information gained during sessions with
patients could expose a physician to criminal charges under
Article 226-13 of the French Penal Code. Article 226-13 of the
penal code states:
The disclosure of information of a confidential nature by a person who
is its depository either by status or profession, or by reason of an office
or of a temporary mission, is punishable by one year of misdemeanor
83
Euros].'
imprisonment and by a fine of 100,000 francs [15,244

178. FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
179. LILLY, supra note 91, at 275.
180. See FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee's notes.
181. See DOMINIQUE THOUVENIN, LE SECRET MDICAL ET L'INFORMATION DU
MALADE 11 (1977).

182. Code de Dbontologie M6dicale, Ddcret No. 95-1000, art. 4 (1995), available
at http://www.cegetel.rss.fr/res/remplacements/deontologie.pdf [hereinafter Code]
("Le secret professionnel, institu6 dans l'intdrbt des patients, s'impose A tout
mddecin dans les conditions 6tablies par la loi. Le secret couvre tout ce qui est venu
A la connaissance du m~decin dans l'exercice de sa profession, c'est-A-dire non
seulement ce qui lui a tk confi6, mais aussi ce qu'il a vu, entendu ou compris.").
183. THE FRENCH PENAL CODE OF 1994 141 (Edward Wise ed., Edward A.
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The offense encompasses all medical professions and roles.'
The information gained while a doctor acts as a psychotherapist,
therefore, is treated equally by the penal code as information
gained when he or she acts as a physician.
For a physician to commit a breach of confidentiality, the
penal code requires that the disclosed information be "a
secret."85 Furthermore, the information must have been obtained during the performance of professional duties, and
includes everything a physician observes or hears during a
patient's treatment. 186 The criminal offense does not require an
injury to the patient as a result of the disclosure or an intention
to cause harm.'8 7 Article 226-13 serves as a prohibition against
disclosure or discovery of information protected by physicianpatient confidentiality.'
A physician can, therefore, refuse to
answer questions relating to information acquired during
sessions with patients and, in fact, is prohibited from doing so.
If, however, the disclosed information is not considered
confidential, a physician will not face charges or disciplinary
action. 189
1. Exceptions to Findinga Breach of Patient-Physician
Confidentiality
While Article 226-13 functions as an absolute bar to
disclosure of confidential information, Article 226-14 carves out
exceptions to this rule that may permit a physician's testimony
under certain circumstances. Article 226-14 of the criminal code
states that:
Article 226-13 is not applicable in cases where the law requires or
authorizes the disclosure of a secret. Additionally, Article 226-13 is
not applicable:

Tomlinson trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1999) (translating CODE PPNAL [C. PaN]
art. 226-13 (Fr.)) [hereinafter FRENCH PENAL CODE I ("La rdvelation d'une
information A caracthre secret par une personne qui en est ddspositaire soit par 6tat
ou par profession, soit en raison d'une fonction ou d'une mission temporaire, est
punie d'un an d'emprisonnement et de 100,000 F d'amende [15,244 Euros].").
184. THOUVENIN, supra note 181, at 15.
185. Sabine Michalowski, Medical Confidentiality and Medical Privilege--a
Comparison of French and German Law, 5 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 89, 91 (1998).

186. Id. at 90-91.
187. Id. at 91.
188. Id. at 92-93.
189. See infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of a
patient's consent on Article 226-13).
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1) To a person who informs judicial, medical, or administrative
authorities of deprivations or maltreatments, including sexual
assaults, of which he or she has knowledge and which have been
inflicted on a minor less than fifteen years of age or on a person
unable to protect himself or herself by reason of age or physical or
mental condition.
2)

To a physician who, with the assent of the victim, brings to the
attention of the public prosecutor the maltreatment he or she has
confirmed in the exercise of his or her profession and which
permits the physician
190 to presume that sexual violence of any kind
has been committed.

Similarly, Article 12 of the French Medical Ethical Code
states that a physician is required to reveal certain information
to the proper authorities when that information is necessary for
the public's protection and health. 9 ' Article 44 of the Medical
Code states that if a physician discerns that a person is a victim
of ill-treatment or injury but by reason of their age, or
physical or psychological state, the person cannot adequately
protect him or herself, the physician is under duty to alert
judicial, medical,
or administrative authorities of the
9 2
misconduct.
Under French law, there is a conflict between medical
confidentiality on the one hand, and a citizen's duty to give
testimony, on the other. Article 109 of the French code of criminal procedure creates a legal obligation to testify when ordered
by a court of law, but Article 109 also contains a provision
exempting those subject to professional confidentiality who
would otherwise be subject to Article 226-13 and 226-14
sanctions. According to Article 109, "Every person who was
subpoenaed to be heard as a witness is under a duty to appear,
to swear an oath, and to testify subject to the provisions of
Articles 226-13 and 226-14 criminal code." 93
190. FRENCH PENAL CODE, supra note 183, at 142 (emphasis added).
191. Code, supra note 182, art. 12 ("Le m~decin doit apporter son concours A
l'action entreprise par les autoritds compdtentes en vue de la protection de la sant6
et de l'ducation sanitaire.").
192.
Id. art. 44 ("Lorsqu'un m~decin discerne qu'une personne auprs de
laquelle ilest appel est victime de svices ou de privations, il doit mettre en oeuvre
les moyens les plus addquats pour la protdger en faisant preuve de prudence et de
circonspection. S'il s'agit d'un mineur de quinze ans ou d'une personne qui n'est pas
en mesure de se protdger en raison de son age ou de son 6tat physique ou psychique
il doit, sauf circonstances particuli~res qu'il apprcie en conscience, alerter les
autoritds judiciaires, m~dicales ou administratives.").
193. CODE DE PROCEDURE P9NAL [C. PR. PEN] art. 109 (Fr.), available at

http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspadlRechercheSimpleArticleCode?code=CPROCP
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Article 109 only exempts a physician from testifying if
obligated to maintain confidentiality. The article is generally
interpreted as a protection against a court's attempt to compel a
physician to testify about confidential communications with
So, in addition to a physician's duty to testify as a
patients.'
citizen, he or she also has an exception when bound by
confidentiality. But it is still not clear whether a physician may
testify if he or she elects to do so.'95
2. Consent, Waiver, and Dispensing with Medical
Confidentiality Under Criminal and Civil Law
French criminal courts treat medical confidentiality
differently than civil courts, primarily because the two have
different interpretations of the purpose of physician-patient
confidentiality.'96 While both value confidentiality as a means of
protecting the patient's interest, the criminal system does not
allow a patient's expressed interest-that is their consent-to
overwhelm the more general notion of a patient's interest in
privacy and bodily integrity. 197 A civil court, meanwhile, allows
the patient's consent to serve as an expression of their interest,
negating the element of confidentiality and therefore allowing a
doctor to testify. 19s
According to French criminal law, a doctor cannot be
relieved of her duty to protect physician-patient confidentiality
by a patient's consent alone. 9 9 This approach has been criticized because it does not recognize that consent negates one of
the requisite elements of Article 226-13, namely, that the
information revealed be "secret."2 0 0 Nonetheless, the duty is
interpreted to guarantee confidentiality absolutely and completely, such that neither a court order alone nor a patient's
consent will suffice. 20 ' Additionally, French criminal courts do
EL.rcv&art=109&indice=3 ("Toute personne cit6e pour tre entendue comme temoin
est tenue de comparaitre, de prater serment et de deposer, sous rserve des
dispositions des articles 226-13 et 226-14 du Code penal.").
194. Michalowski, supra note 185.
195. Id. at 97 (noting that some commentators on French law believe that 109
only acts to prevent a court from compelling testimony when 226-13 is applicable but
allows those who fall under the protection of 226-13 to testify if they wish).
196. Id. at 107.
197. Id. at 95.
198. Id. at 107.
199. Id. at 95.
200. Id. at 106.
201. Id. at 103 (citing cases: 8 May 1947, JCP.1948.1.414; 22 December 1966,
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not distinguish between cases where the patient is attempting
to invoke the physician's testimony as part of their defense and
cases where the patient is a victim of another's crime.2" 2 A
physician will still be subject to punishment in either scenario
under Article 226-13.203
The principle that neither the court nor the patient alone
can force the doctor's testimony receives varied interpretations
in court decisions. In its December 22, 1966 decision, the Cour
de Cassation reviewed a case in which a woman who had been
accused of stabbing her husband to death called her physician
as a witness to reveal certain facts regarding her medical
condition. 20 4 The physician refused on the grounds that the
information was confidential.2 °5
The court held that the
defendant's consent alone was insufficient to relieve
20 6 the
physician of his duty to maintain medical confidentiality.
Once a physician has been called and the patient has
consented to the testimony, courts have ruled that the decision
rests with the physician alone whether to honor the
confidentiality or disclose the information. In its June 5, 1985
decision, the Cour de Cassation held that if a patient consented
to a physician's testimony but the physician refused, the court
"cannot determine for the physician in which cases the
revelation of confidential information is appropriate."20 7 The
relevance of this opinion is that the disclosure of information
would not, under these circumstances, be considered criminal
under Article 226-13.
If the proceedings take place in criminal court, a doctor can
neither be compelled by a court to testify, nor permitted by a
patient to testify, nor can the doctor testify of his/her own
accord. 20 " The only exception appears to be if both of the latter
elements exist concomitantly.2 9 If a doctor is called by the court
to testify and had been given consent by her patients, the
D.1967.122; 16 December 1992, Bull n* 424).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 104 (citing 22 December 1966, D.1967.122).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. (citing 5 June 1985, Bull n* 218). Here the physician was called as a
defense witness. The accused patient had consented to the testimony, but the
physician refused anyway. The court held that it was up to the physician only
whether or not to testify, and he could at that point be neither compelled nor
silenced. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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decision would be hers as to whether to testify. To testify under
those circumstances would not be a violation of medical
confidentiality.
The civil chamber of the Cour de Cassation allows for the
disclosure of confidential material if the patient has consented
to its revelation. 2 0 An absolute prohibition of medical disclosure is impracticable in a civil court where physicians are frequently called as witnesses to prove medical facts. 211 No one
benefits from a physician's silence where a patient wants these
facts revealed.212 When the secret's master has consented to its
revelation213in a civil case, there is no longer a duty of confidentiality.
Finally, France ratified the Torture Convention on
February 18, 1986.214 Article 4 of the Torture Convention
requires state parties to criminalize torture under their criminal
laws. ' 15 France also ratified the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(European

Human Rights Convention) on May 3,

1974.216

Article 3 of the European Human Rights Convention prohibits
torture by stating "[n]o one shall be subjected to17torture or to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
D. THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM'S TREATMENT OF
CONFIDENTIALITY

The English legal system is a common-law based system.218
210. Id. at 107.
211. Id. (citing Trib. Civ. de la Seine, D.1955.588).
212. Id. at 108.
213. Id.
214. Torture Convention, supranote 10.
215. Id. art. 4.
216. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at
http://www.unhcr.md/article/conv.htm
[hereinafter European Human Rights
Convention].
217. Id. art. 3.
218. 3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS ENYCLOPEDIA 3.230.7 (Linda L. Schlueter ed.,
2001) (explaining that the United Kingdom is a union of England, Wales, Scotland,
and Northern Ireland, though the English legal system is only concerned with
England and Wales while both Scotland and Northern Ireland have their own
systems of law and courts); see also L. B. CURZON, LAW OF EVIDENCE 3 (2d ed. 1986)
(1978) ("In general, trials under English law reflect the adversary system ... parties
and their representatives have primary responsibility for finding and presenting
evidence .... The judge does not generally investigate the facts; he acts as an
umpire between parties, rather than as an inquisitor."); GARY SLAPPER AND DAVID
KELLY, Q&A SERIES: ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 51 (2d ed. 1995) ("The doctrine of
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Much of English evidentiary law is based on the assumption
that the normal method of trial is by judge and jury.21 9 Though
very few criminal cases and hardly any civil cases are tried by
jury today, English rules of evidence still reflect the common
law approach to evidence.
Under English rules of evidence,
admissibility questions are ones of law, and therefore determined by a judge. 221' The laws governing evidence are generally
the same for civil and criminal proceedings.2 22
Privilege is a rule that entitles one party to withhold
relevant evidence and refuse to answer questions in court.223
English courts recognize two forms of testimonial privilege: the
legal advice privilege (communications related to obtaining legal
advice and assistance from a solicitor are privileged), and the
litigation privilege (communications between the client and
solicitor for the sole or dominant purpose of litigation or for
collecting evidence for the litigation, are privileged).224 Marital
privilege (the right of spouses not to disclose communications
made between them during marriage) was abolished in civil
cases by the 1968 Civil Evidence Act, and in criminal cases by
the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.225 Under English rules of
evidence, communications
with doctors, priests, and journalists
• 1 1226
are not privileged.
English courts have consistently held that
testimonial privileges for professionals are of a very limited
character, and privileges are restricted to obtaining a lawyer's
assistance.22 7 One of the most cited cases on the issue of doctorbinding precedent, or stare decisis, lies at the heart of the English legal system. In
essence, the doctrine refers to the fact that within the hierarchal structure of the
English courts, a decision of a higher court will be binding on a court lower than it in
that hierarchy.").
219. PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE 1 (M. N. Howard et al. eds., 15th ed. 2000) (1892).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 14.
222. CURZON, supra note 218, at 10.
223. PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE, supra note 219, at 503.
224. Id. at 506-507.
225. CURZON, supra note 218, at 152.
226. Id. at 155; D.B. CASSON & I.H. DENNIS, MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 61 (1982) ("Professional privilege is restricted to the legal
profession, and does not extend to protect communications with other professional
advisers, such as accountants and doctors. However, in appropriate cases, the party
seeking discovery may be required to give an undertaking not to divulge the
contents of such documents to any person otherwise than for the purposes of
litigation.. . ." (footnotes omitted)); PHIPSON ON EVIDENCE, supra note 219, at 506.
227. Wheeler v. Le Marchant, (1881) 17 Ch.D. 675, 681; Southwark and
Vauxhall Water Co. v. Quick, (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 315, 321; Anderson v. Bank of B.C.,
(1876) 2 Ch.D. 644, 648; see also P. ST. J. LANGAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
229 (1970); ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 404 (2d ed.
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patient privilege is Wheeler v. Le Marchant, where Judge M.R.
Jessel stated that "the communications made to a medical
man... are not protected."22 8

Another frequently cited case on the issue of privilege is
Hunter v. Mann, where the court ordered a doctor to disclose
information supplied by his patients in order to discover the
identity of the drunk driver who had hit them. 229 The Hunter v.
Mann court held that medical practitioners, unlike lawyers, are
not protected or bound by professional privilege.2 0 In D. v.
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Lord
Edmund-Davies wrote that "we have no doubt that the only
kind of professional privilege
which English law allows is that of
23 1
legal adviser and client."

In criminal cases, however, judges have discretion to
exclude legally admissible evidence that is tendered by the
prosecution. 22 The judge, as part of his or her duty to ensure
fair trials, has discretion in criminal cases to refuse nonprivileged, legally admissible evidence if the prejudicial effect of
the evidence on the accused outweighs its probative value.233 In
civil cases, judges have no discretion and they must admit all
non-privileged relevant evidence. Discretion in criminal cases is
determined on a case-by-case basis.234
Nonetheless, a communication's confidentiality is never a
justification for invoking a testimonial privilege; there must be

Butterworths 1989) (1985).
228. Wheeler v. Le Marchant, (1881) 17 Ch.D. 675, 681.
229. Hunter v. Mann, [19741 Q.B. 767, 768.
230. Id. at 772-73.
231. D. v. Nat'l Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, [1978] A.C. 171,
244 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.) (quoting THE CRIMINAL LAW REVISION
COMMITTEE, ELEVENTH REPORT (EVIDENCE (GENERAL)), 1972, Cmnd. 6252) ("During
the hearing of this appeal it was suggested that the report demonstrated that it is no
longer right to say that The only profession... which is given a privilege from
disclosing information to a court of law is the legal profession' and that a judge is,
for example, nowadays always entitled to direct a doctor not to answer a question
concerning his patient's health on the simple ground that disclosure was opposed by
his patient. I know of no decided cases supporting such a view or of any textbook
writers who indicate that such is the law. On the contrary, the writers are
unanimous that only in the case of lawyers and their clients is the court so
empowered....-).
232. KEANE, supra note 227, at 33.
233. R v. Sang, (1980) A.C. 402, 402 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K);
Morris v. Beardmore, (1981) A.C. 446, 469 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.);
Selvey v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, (1970) A.C. 304, 352 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.) (U.K.).
234. KEANE, supra note 227, at 33.
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additional reasons for excluding relevant evidence.235 In Science
Research Council v. Nass6, Lord Wilberforce held that the
ultimate test was whether discovery of the confidential
communication was necessary for a fair trial; if it was, discovery
must be ordered notwithstanding confidentiality.236 The case
involved allegations of sex and national origin discrimination
concerning job promotions, and the two plaintiffs sought
preliminary discovery of confidential reports about other
interviewees for the same position, prepared by the hiring
employers. 237 Lord Wilberforce stated that where the court was
impressed with the need to preserve confidentiality, it would
consider whether the necessary information could be obtained
by other means not involving a breach of confidence.2 38
In British Steel Corp. v. Granada, the court ordered the
disclosure of an informant's identity who, as a former employee
of the plaintiff, had sent the plaintiffs secret documents to the
defendant. 23 9
Lord Wilberforce stated that courts had an
inherent wish to respect confidences arising between doctorpatients, priest-penitents or in other relationships, but in all
those cases, courts might have to decide that the interest of
preserving confidences was outweighed by the interest of
avoiding the denial ofjustice.240 The court in British Steel Corp.
approved the dictum of Lord Denning in Attorney-General v.
Mulholland, who argued that the judge, as a person entrusted
on behalf
of the community, had to balance confidentiality with
241
justice.
1. Breaches of Confidentiality Under British Law
Under British law, "there is no general statutory protection
for medical information." 24 2 All health care professionals
employed by the National Health Service, however, are required
by their employment contract to maintain patients' confi-

235. Wheeler v. Le Marchant, (1881) 17 Ch.D. 675, 681.
236. Science Research Council v. Nass6, (1980) A.C. 1028, 1029 (H.L.) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (U.K).
237. Id. at 1028.
238. Id. at 1034.
239. British Steel Corp. v. Granada Television Ltd., (1981) A.C. 1096, 1096-97
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K).
240. Id. at 1170-71 (emphasis added).
241. AG v. Mulholland, (1963) 2 Q.B. 477, 489-90.
242. JEAN MCHALE ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 473
(1997).
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dentiality.
The duty of confidentiality is generally governed by
professional ethical codes. The 1858 Medical Act recognized
medicine as a single profession and created the General Medical
Council (GMC). 24 4 The 1983 Medical Act granted the GMC the
power to take disciplinary action against doctors who were
guilty of serious professional misconduct. 2 " The GMC adopted
its rules of Professional Conduct and Discipline (Blue Book) in
1995, under which it provided broad protections against
disclosure of confidential information.2 46 Judicial decisions have
often referred to the GMC's rules in actions for breach of
confidentiality.2 47 Similarly, the British Medical Association
(BMA), a professional association of doctors of which about 80%
of all doctors in England are members, has adopted its Guidance
on "Confidentiality and disclosure of health information"
(Guidance) with broad confidentiality requirements.
More
over, Lord Goff in Attorney-General v. Guardianexpressly recognized the existence of a confidentiality requirement in the
English legal system.
A doctor who fails to keep patients'
confidences may face disciplinary actions from his or her
professional association as well as in civil actions (in the form of
actions for breach of confidence, breach of implied contract, or
negligence).5
The duty of confidentiality is not absolute, and certain
243. Id. at 439.
244. JONATHAN MONTGOMERY, HEALTH CARE LAw 137 (1997).
245. Id. at 142.
246. McHALE ET AL., supra note 242, at 440 ("Confidentiality: Guidance from the
General Medical Council (London: GMC 1995) 1. Patients have a right to expect that
you will not disclose any personal information which you learn during the course of
your professional duties....").
247. W. v. Egdell, (1990) 1 All E.R. 835 (applying rules 79-81 of the GMC's Blue
Book to determine the duty of confidence owed by a doctor to a patient).
248. BMA Guidance, "Confidentiality and Disclosure of Health Information"
(Oct.
14,
1999),
available
at
http://www.bma.org.uk/ap.nsf/Contentl
Confidentialitydisclosure?OpenDocument&Highlight=2,confidentiality,disclosure
("Patients have a right to expect that identifiable information about themselves
provided or discovered in the course of their health care will not be shared with
other people without their knowledge, and the disclosure of identifiable information
to someone who did not previously know it, breaches confidentiality.").
249. AG v. Guardian Newspapers, (1988) 3 All E.R. 545.
250. See R v. Dep't of Health, (2001) Q.B. 424, 426 ("For a case of breach of
confidence to succeed (1) the information must have the necessary quality of
confidence about it; (2) the information must have been imparted in circumstances
importing an obligation of confidence; and (3) there must be unauthorized use of
that information to the detriment of the party communicating it."); see also MCHALE
ET AL., supra note 242, at 447.
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situations require the disclosure of otherwise confidential
information.
One of the exceptions to the confidentiality
requirement is the "public interest exception."251 Courts have
allowed the disclosure of confidential information when it is in
the public's interest to do So.52 Rule 81(g) of the GMC's Blue
Book- also provides a public interest exception to the
confidentiality rule.25 3 For example in W. v. Edgell, the court
dismissed a breach of confidence action against a doctor who
informed authorities of his psychopathic patient's obsession
with explosives.254 In 1996, the Department of Health issued its
guidance regarding the justifiable disclosure of confidential
information on public interest grounds.25 5 The public interest
exception is usually invoked to prevent fraud, criminal conduct,
and iniquity.256 The BMA's Guidance requires disclosure of
confidential information when public safety is threatened.2 57
The BMA's Guidance specifically states that doctors owe a duty
to society and this duty may require, in circumstances involving
a threat to public safety or public health, disclosure of
confidential information.2 5
Another exception to the confidentiality requirement arises
when the doctor is compelled by a court of law to disclose the

251. MCHALE ETAL., supra note 242, at 454.
252. Beloffv. Pressdram Ltd., (1973) 1 All E.R. 241, 260; Initial Services, Ltd. v.
Putterill, (1967) 3 All E.R. 145, 147.
253. MCHALE ET AL., supra note 242, at 461 ("[811(g) Rarely, disclosure may be
justified on the ground that it is in the public interest which, in certain
circumstances such as, for example, investigation by the police of a grave or serious
crime..
").
254. W. v. Egdell, (1990) 1 All E.R. 835.
255. The Protection and Use of Patient Information, Guidance from the
Department of Health (DOH, 1996): 5.8 (stating that passing on information to help
tackle serious crime may be justified if the following conditions are satisfied: (i)
without disclosure, the task of preventing, detecting, or prosecuting the crime would
be seriously prejudiced or delayed; (ii) information is limited to what is strictly
relevant for a specific investigation; (iii) there are satisfactory undertakings that the
information will not be passed on or used for any purpose other than the present
investigation).
256. MONTGOMERY, supra note 244, at 257 ("The final general exception to
confidentiality arises where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public
interest in ensuring confidentiality. This does not oblige health professionals to
breach confidence, but permits them to do so if they judge it necessary.").
257. BMA Guidance, supra note 248 ("Personal health information may be
disclosed properly without consent because there is perceived to be a strong public
interest justifying disclosure. Disclosure which is essential to prevent or lessen a
serious and imminent threat to public health or to the life or health of another
individual typifies this category of justification.").
258. Id.
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communication between him or her and the patient. 59 The
relationship between a medical practitioner and his patient does
not excuse the practitioner from the obligation to give evidence
in a court of law. 26' A doctor may be summoned to give evidence

in civil or criminal cases and may be punished by contempt if he
or she refuses to testify.261

When a judge orders a doctor to

testify as to the substance of confidential communications, the
doctor's duty of confidentiality is overridden by the needs of
justice and a fair trial.262 The BMA's Guidance states that
"When a patient has not given consent for the disclosure of
medical records, health professionals are nonetheless justified in
disclosing information when they believe on reasonable grounds
that a court has authorized it." 263 The GMC's rules advise

doctors to disclose confidential information when the court
requests it. 264 Accordingly, disclosing confidential information
when requested by a court of law does not amount to a breach
of
6
1
confidentiality and may not give rise to an action for breach.
Like France, the United Kingdom has ratified the Torture

Convention and the European Human Rights Convention.26 6 The
Human Rights Act of 1998, which came into force on October 2,
2000, incorporated into UK law the substantive rights set out in
259. Parry-Jones v. Law Soc'y, (1969) 1 Ch. 1, 9 ("[A] duty of confidence is
subject to, and overridden by, the duty of any party to comply with the law of the
land.... For example, in the case of banker and customer, the duty of confidence is
subject to the overriding duty of the banker at common law to disclose and answer
questions as to his customer's affairs when he is asked to give evidence on them in
the witness box in a court of law. I think that similar provisions as to disclosure
apply to doctors under the National Health Act.").
260. 30 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 18 (4th ed. 1973).
261. Id.; MONTGOMERY, supra note 244, at 267 ("[H]ealth professionals have no
right to withhold confidential information from a court when called as a witness. It
is legitimate to ask permission from the judge to decline to answer a question
because it would involve breaching confidence but if the judge requires it, the
information must be revealed.").
262. W. v. Egdell, (1990) 1 All E.R. 846 (noting the exception to confidentiality in
the GMC's Blue Book, when "the doctor is directed to disclose information by a judge
or other presiding officer of a court").
263. BMA Guidance, supra note 248.
264. MCHALE ET AL., supra note 242, at 443 ("You may also disclose information
if ordered to do so by a judge or presiding officer of a court.... You should object to
the judge or the presiding officer if attempts are made to compel you to disclose
other matters which appear in the notes, for example matters relating to relatives or
partners of the patient who are not parties to the proceeding.").
265. J. K. MASON & R.A. MCCALL SMITH, LAW AND MEDICAL ETHICS 107 (1983)
("The doctor in the witness box has absolute privilege and is protected against action
for breach of confidence.").
266. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 216; Torture Convention,
supra note 10.
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the European Human Rights Convention . 267 Article 3 of the
Human Rights Act states, "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture
or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."2 68 Under
Section 134 of the 1988 Criminal Justice Act, torture is a
criminal act punishable by imprisonment.2 69
2. The Inadmissibility of Hearsay Evidence UnderBritish Law
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement proffered as evidence
of any fact or opinion contained in the statement.27 ° Under the
common-law rule in both civil and criminal proceedings, hearsay
statements are inadmissible for proving the truth of the facts
declared in the statements.2 7' Under modern English law, there
are numerous common-law and statutory exceptions to and
derogations from the rule against hearsay. In civil proceedings,
the 1968 Civil Evidence Act largely reversed the rule against
hearsay. 72 In criminal cases the 1984 Police and Criminal
Evidence Act and the 1988 Criminal Justice Act have allowed
for the admissibility of confessions and certain hearsay
statements in documents.2 72
In addition to those statutory
provisions, hearsay statements are admissible if the statements
fall under one of the various common-law exceptions to the
hearsay rule.274
One of the common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule is the
statement of physical sensation, which allows the admissibility
of statements relating to one's bodily condition.275 In R v.
Nicholas, the court held that "[i]f a man says to his surgeon, 'I
have a pain in the head,' or a pain in such a part of the body,
that is evidence."276 A statement concerning bodily condition
267. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K), available at http://www.hmso.gov.uk/
acts/acts1998/19980042.htm#aofs.
268. Id. sched. 1, Part 1, art. 3.
269. Criminal Justice Act, 1991, c. 33, s. 134; see also R v. Bow Street Metro.
Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [2000] 1 A.C. 61 (H.L.) (U.K.);
Hutchinson v. Newbury Magistrates Court 0., 2000 W.L. 1480082 CO/663/00; The
Queen on the Application of Tadeusz Roszkowiski v. Special Adjudicator, 2000 W.L.
1629499.
270. KEANE, supra note 227, at 176.
271. R v. Gibson, (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 537, 539; SIR RUPERT CROSS, EVIDENCE 6 (5th
ed. 1979).
272. KEANE, supra note 227, at 176.
273. Id.
274. G. D. NOKES, COCKLE'S CASES AND STATUTES ON EVIDENCE 161 (11th ed.
1970).
275. CROSS, supra note 271, at 589-90.
276. R v. Nicholas, (1846) 2 Car. & Kir. 246, 248.
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does not have to be contemporaneous with physical sensation.
The exception concerning physical sensation does not cover
statements relating to the cause of the sensation or condition.
Another exception to the hearsay rule S•is279 a statement
concerning the offeror's state of mind or emotion.
Statements
concerning emotions are admissible to prove the existence of
political opinion, affection, fear, or dislike, but are inadmissible
to prove the existence of the conditions that caused the
emotions.8 ° In Thomas v. Connell, the court held that in a fraud
action, a statement by the bankrupt individual that he knew
that he was insolvent was admissible to prove his knowledge of
that fact, but not to prove the insolvency.
There is also an exception to the hearsay rule for
spontaneous statements relating to an event made by
participants or observers.
The exception requires close association in time between the statement and the event so that the
declarant would be less likely
to make a distortion of facts or an
23
error relating to the facts.
The 1968 Civil Evidence Act has limited the scope of the
hearsay evidence rule in civil proceedings. 28 ' The 1968 Civil
Evidence Act allows the court to admit hearsay evidence if
notice is given. 285 Although there is no statutory authority
concerning a judge's discretion to include hearsay evidence in
criminal cases, courts have decided against such discretion in
criminal cases.286
E. JAPANESE LAW REGARDING INTERNATIONAL TREATIES,
TORTURE, AND TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE

Japan is a civil law nation using primarily codified laws.287
277. See R v. Black, (1922) 16 Crim. App. 118, 119.
278. See Gilbey v. Great W. Ry. Co., (1910) 102 L.T. 202, 203.
279. See KEANE, supra note 227, at 220-21.
280.

See id.

281. See Thomas v. Connell, (1838) 4 M. & W. 267.
282. CROSS, supra note 271, at 578.
283. See Ratten v. The Queen, [1972] A.C. 378, 390 (P.C.) (appeal taken from
Vict.).
284. KEANE, supra note 227, at 224.
285. Id.
286. See Myers v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, (1964) 2 All E.R. 881, 887 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Crim. App.) ("It is true that a judge has a discretion to exclude
legally admissible evidence if justice so requires, but it is a very different thing to
say that he has a discretion to admit legally inadmissible evidence.").
287. See A. DIDRICK CASTBERG, JAPANESE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 5 (1990); HIROSHI
ODA, JAPANESE LAW 35 (2d ed. 1999). There are six major "codes": the Constitution,
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The Japanese Constitution has three basic tenets: the
sovereignty of people, the pacifism of the nation, and the
inviolability of fundamental human rights. 25" Article 36 of the
Constitution strictly prohibits the use of torture and cruel
punishment by government officials.5 9
Article 98, paragraph 2, of the Constitution states that
treaties as well as the established laws of nations must be
faithfully observed. 9 °
Japan ratified the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights in 1979 and acceded to
the Torture Convention in 1999.291 Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits the use of
torture, while Article 4 of the Torture Convention requires State
parties to criminalize the acts of torture.292 A Japanese criminal
court is under an obligation to prevent future torture and to
prosecute any perpetrators of torture.
The Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure governing the
rules of evidence was enacted in 1948 and was largely modeled
on U.S. laws. 93 Article 143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
the Civil Code, the Commercial Code, the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal
Procedure, and the Code of Civil Procedure. Id. at 35. The Constitution is the
"Supreme Law of the nation." Id. Next are statute laws enacted by the Diet (the
legislative body), then Cabinet orders, followed by ministerial ordinances. Id.
288. See MERYLL DEAN, JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM: TEXT AND MATERIALS 506
(1997). Chapter III of the constitution provides an extensive list of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, but that list is not exhaustive. See id. at 618. Article 13
of the constitution allows courts to recognize rights that are not specifically provided
in the constitution. It states: "All of the people shall be respected as individuals.
Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it
does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in
legislation and in other governmental affairs." Id. (translating NIHONKOKU KENPO
(1946) [KENPOI art. 13 (Japan)).
289. See id. at 620. Article 36 states: 'The infliction of torture by any public
officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden." Id.
290. ODA, supra note 287, at 49 (writing that treaties are incorporated directly
into the national legal order without enacting legislation).
291. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, availableat http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/
englishinternetbible/partl/chapterIV/treaty6.asp; Torture Convention, supra note
10.
292. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 291, art. 4;
Torture Convention, supra note 10, art. 4.
293. See Keiji sosh6h6 (Code of Criminal Procedure) [KEISOH6] (Japan),
translated in 1 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, CODES AND STATUTES OF JAPAN
(1948). Under the 1948 Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal trials are held in
public and are adversarial in character, which means that parties, instead of judges,
take the initiative to produce and examine evidence. See DEAN, supra note 288, at
415 (diagramming the trial process). A typical criminal case has four phases during
the trial: opening, examination of evidence, closing arguments, and judgment. See
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states "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this law, a court may
examine any person whomsoever as a witness."2 94 Nonetheless,
Article 149 recognizes a testimonial privilege for doctors,
lawyers, and priests.2 5 The second paragraph of Article 149
admits the testimony if the clients or patients have consented to
the disclosure, which arguably designates the holder of the
privilege as the client or the patient.
The recognition of a
doctor-patient privilege in criminal cases is in accordance with
the court decisions, which have long recognized the doctorpatient privilege in civil cases. 297 The protection of professional
and industry
secrets is deemed important in the Japanese legal
.
298
system.
Under Article 134 of the Japanese Penal Code and Article
14 of the Medical Practitioners' Law, Japanese physicians are
legally obligated to protect patients' privacy.29 9 Article 134 of
id.
294. KEISOHO, supra note 293, art. 143, at 36.
295. Id. art. 149, at 38 (permitting doctors, lawyers, priests, and others to refuse
to testify about knowledge received through professional work that relates to
"secrets of other persons"). The article provides:
A person who is, or was, a doctor, dentist, midwife, nurse, advocate, patent
agent, notary public or a religious functionary may refuse testimony in
respect to facts of which he has obtained knowledge in consequence of a
mandate he has received in professional lines and which relates to secrets
of other persons. However, this shall not apply if the principal (clients) has
consented, or if the refusal of testimony is deemed as nothing but an abuse
of right intended merely for the interest of the accused when he is not the
principal or if there exist any special circumstances which shall be provided
by the Rules of Court.
Id. (emphasis added).
296. See id.
297. See Caryl Ben Basat & Julian D. Nihill, Corporate Counsel, 31 INT'L. L.
245, 255 (1997). The attorney-client privilege was recently codified for the first time
in Japan under the new Civil Procedure Law. See id. at 254-55. Prior to the new
Civil Procedure Law's enactment, privilege was mainly treated in connection with
the disclosure of medical documents. Id. at 255. There were, however, several cases
which ruled that a doctor is not obligated to disclose documents which record
communication with, or medical history or diagnosis of, his or her patients. Id.
Japanese lawyers have interpreted the rulings regarding the disclosure of medical
documents to imply that correspondence with their clients is privileged. Id.
298. Jason Marin, Invoking The U.S. Attorney-Client Privilege: Japanese
Corporate Quasi Lawyers Deserve Protection In U.S. Courts Too, 21 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1558, 1605 (1998).
299. See Robert B. Leflar, Informed Consent and Patients'Rights in Japan, 33
Hous. L. REv. 1, 35 (1996). Under company health insurance plans, however,
employees' medication and treatment charges must be reported to the health
insurance association. See id. This information can then be obtained by employers,
which has raised serious problems for HIV patients-and at least one case has been
reported in which an individual was fired after his employer's human resources
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the 1954 Penal Code states that "[w]hen a doctor, pharmacist,
[or] druggist ...without cause, discloses a secret which has
come to his knowledge in the course of the conduct of his
profession, imprisonment at forced labor for not more than six
months or a fine of not more than one hundred yen shall be
imposed."300 Article 155 of the Penal Code states that secrecy
Patientviolations shall be prosecuted only upon complaint.'
physician relationships are considered as creating binding
contracts, which are confidential or fiduciary in nature.0 2
Individual privacy and the right to one's personal sphere
have been established rights in Japan since the 1960s. 3 ' The
Japanese courts first recognized invasion of privacy as a tort in
the 1964 case of Arita v. Hiraoka. °4 Nonetheless, Japanese laws
concerning confidentiality do not specify the contours of the
obligation to protect privacy rights, and no case has been
decided thus far on the issue of the breach of medical
confidentiality.30 5 Article 134 of the Penal Code does not define
what would constitute a justifiable "cause" such that the
disclosure would not be considered a violation of secrecy.
The traditional Japanese approach to medical ethics
emphasizes the trust relationship between the doctor and the
patient, as well as the complete reliance upon doctors' judgments, rather than the obligations of the doctors toward their
office learned of his HIV status. See id. at 35-36.
300. KEIHO (Penal Code) art. 134 (Japan), translated in THE CRIMINAL CODE OF
JAPAN 87 (Thomas L. Blakemore trans., 1954).
301. Id. art. 135, at 87.
302. Marc A. Rodwin & Atoz Okamoto, Physicians Conflicts of Interest in Japan
and the United States: Lessons for the United States, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
343, 349 (2000). Japanese fiduciary law is less developed in medical jurisprudence,
and courts do not generally invoke fiduciary principles to decide cases of consent,
medical malpractice, or other health law issues. Id. Instead, Japan shares the
United States' medical ideal that doctors should act in the best interest of patients.
Nonetheless, both the Japan Medical Association (JMA) Code of Ethics and the more
recent JMA report on social responsibility of doctors and professionalism do not
explicitly address physicians' conflicts of interest (Physicians' Ethics Code 1951;
Fourth Committee on Bioethics 1996). Id.
303. Marc Lim, The First Step Forward - The AIDS Dismissal Case and the
ProtectionAgainst AIDS-Based Employment Discriminationin Japan, 7 PAC. RIM L.
& POLV J. 451, 476 (1998).
304. Id. at 459, 476 (detailing how in 1995, a Brazilian working in Japan filed
suit against his employer and his hospital for violating his privacy when it
conducted an HIV test without his permission, after which time he was fired for
testing positive).
305. Cf id. at 475-77 (discussing the lack of a bright line rule protecting
employees' medical privacy and noting that the Japanese legislature and courts have
failed to create a broad privacy right).
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patients.0 6 In the long tradition of Japanese medical practice,
the Confucian notion of jin (benevolence) has been the most
important ethical principle, and physicians, as conduits of jin,
were required to act with benevolence toward their patients.o'
Physicians fulfilled their responsibilities toward their patients
by acting in a paternalistic and authoritative way, and the
doctor-patient relationship was analogous to a child-parent
relationship where parents decided what was best for the
child.3 °8
F. CONFIDENTIAL TESTIMONY IN A BELGIAN CRIMINAL CHAMBER
law

Belgium is a civil law country. Primary sources of Belgian
are the Constitution, codes and statutes, delegated

legislations, and international law.30 9 Treaties are not selfexecuting in Belgium and they must be ratified by the King,
approved by the Parliament, and published in the Official
Gazette in order to have legal effect.310 Belgium is a State Party
to the European Human Rights Convention, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Torture
Convention.3 1' Recently, Belgium has proved to be a particularly
relevant jurisdiction for analysis because Belgian courts have

been assuming universal jurisdiction over cases involving
crimes against humanity.1

2

A case involving torture could

therefore be brought before a Belgian court."
Article 458 of the Belgian Criminal Code states:
Doctors, surgeons, health officers, pharmacists, midwives and all other

306.

3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 1496-97 (Warren Thomas Reich ed., 1995).

307.
308.

Id. at 1496.
Id.

309.
310.

HERMAN NYs, MEDICAL LAW IN BELGIUM 16-18 (1997).

MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 3.20.24 (Linda L. Schlueter ed.,
2000).
311. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 216, art. 3 (prohibiting
the use of torture); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
291, art. 7 (prohibiting the use of torture); Torture Convention, supra note 10, art. 4
(requiring State parties to criminalize the act of torture).
312. See Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law Repealed, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS
(Human Rights Watch), Aug. 1, 2003, http'//www.hrw.org/press/2003/08/
belgium080103.htm. This article notes that the 1993 "universal jurisdiction" law
permitted victims of atrocities abroad to file claims in Belgium. Id. Giving in to
pressure from the United States, Belgium changed the law to give Belgian courts
jurisdiction when the accused or a victim is Belgian. Id. The changes did allow
three notable prosecutions to go forward: a Rwandan genocide case, the murder of
two Belgian priests in Guatemala, and the case against Hiss~ne Habrd. Id.
313. Id.
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professionals who are entrusted with confidences or professional
secrets, as a result of their status or profession, and who disclose them,
shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of between 8 days to six
months and/or subjected to a fine of between 100 and 500 BF [2.48 and
evidence in court or
12.39 Euros] except if they were required to give
4
were obliged, by law, to disclose those secrets.3

Article 458 has a general and absolute character in the
sense that it applies immediately and indiscriminately to every
person (professionals and some non-professionals) who keeps
others' confidences because of a legal obligation, social tradition,
or custom. 15 The doctor's obligation of non-disclosure applies
not only to information obtained directly from the patient but
also to the information about the patient that is acquired from
other sources.316
The professional who fails to abide by the duty to maintain
professional secrecy will also incur disciplinary sanctions under
Belgian laws.317 Every physician has to register with the Order
of Physicians in Belgium. 18 The National Council of the Order
of Physicians is responsible for drafting and implementing
general principles and rules of professional conduct relating to
In 1975, the National Council
the practice of medicine.1 9
announced its Code of Professional Ethics and submitted it to
the Ministry of Public Health.32 ° The provincial councils of the
Order of Physicians ensure the observance of all rules of
professional conduct for doctors as well as the maintenance of
314. Louis Lafili & Nicole Van Crombrugghe, Professional Secrecy of Lawyers in
Belgium, 7-SPG INT'L L. PRACTICUM 18, 22 (1994); Code Pdnal, LOI 8 Juin 1867,

Modifi~e par la loi du 30 Juin 1996; Chapitre VI De Quelques Autres D6lits Contre
Les Personnes, Article 458 ("Les m~decins, chirurgiens, officiers de sant6... et
toutes autres personnes d~positaires par 6tat ou par profession, des secrets qu'on
leur confie, qui hors le cas oti ils sont appel~s A rendre temoignage en justice... et
celui o s la loi les oblige A faire connaitre ces secrets, les auront rv6ls, seront punis
d'un emprisonnement de huit jours b six mois et d'une amende de cent francs Acinq
cent francs.").
315. Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction], 20 fdvrier
1905, Pas. 143 ("La disposition de l'article 458 du code p6nal a un caractore g~ndral
et absolu et doit 6tre appliqu~e indistinctement A toutes les personnes investies
d'une fonction ou d'une mission de confiance, A toutes celles qui sont constitutes par
la loi, la tradition ou les moeurs, les d~positaires n~cessaires des secrets qu'on leur
confie....").
316. NYS, supra note 309, at 88; see also XAVIER RYCKMANS & RtGINE MEERTVAN DE PUT, LES DROITS ET LES OBLIGATIONS DES MIDECINS 112 (2d ed. 1971).
317. Lafili & Van Crombrugghe, supra note 314, at 22.
318. Crown Order No. 79 of 10 November 1967, art. 2.2., Moniteur Belge, 14
November 1967.
319. NYS, supra note 309, at 50.
320. Id.
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dignity and good order.3 2' Although the provincial councils have
no normative authority concerning the elaboration of the
professional rules, they have the power to impose disciplinary
sanctions against their physician members.322 The sanctions the
councils may impose are: warning, censure, reprimand,
suspension of the right to practice medicine for a period less
than two years, or permanent prohibition to practice medicine in
Belgium. 23 Title II, Chapter V of the 1975 Code of Professional
Ethics is related to medical secrecy and prohibits disclosure of
confidential information. 2 4
In addition to the rules of the Order of Physicians, the Law
on the Practice of Medicine contains certain obligations, the
non-compliance of which has been made a disciplinary offense.3 25
Moreover, a doctor who breaches his duty of professional secrecy
may incur civil liability.326 Belgian laws follow the approach of
the French Cour de Cassation, which has held that the
relationship between the physician and the patient is a
contractual one. 27 In addition to an action for breach of
contract, the physician may face tort liability under Article 1382
of the Belgian Civil Code resulting from a claim of negligence.3 28
Under the Belgian Civil Code, patients are required to show
mental or moral damage in order to be entitled to recovery in an
action for breach of the duty of secrecy. 329
A Belgian doctor, who is summoned to give testimony in a
proceeding as to the substance of confidential communications,
is free to disclose the confidential information or refuse to
testif.

33 0

Belgian laws allow doctors to choose between reveal-

321. Id. at 49.
322. Id. at 54.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 51.
325. Id. at 52.
326. Id. at 62.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 66. The author explains that under Article 2262 of the Civil Code,
breach of contract and negligence actions have a statute of limitations that lasts
thirty years. Id. But when that same breach or tort was simultaneously a criminal
act, the civil action must be brought within five years after the criminal act was
allegedly committed. Id. So where there was a breach of the duty of medical secrecy
(which is a crime), an action for breach of contract or negligence must be brought
within five years after disclosure. Id.
330. Cour de Cassation [Cass.], Sept. 23, 1986, Pasicrisie Belge 89, 93 ("Une
personne appelde A rendre tdmoignage en justice au sujet de faits couverts par le
secret professionnel peut rdvdler ces faits si elle estime devoir le faire. Elle apprdcie
elle-m~me l'opportunit6 de conserver le secret .
").
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ing confidential information in the courtroom and keeping it
secret. 33 It is generally recognized that the physician has a
right to silence or testimonial privilege, which permits the physician to refuse to disclose confidential information in the
courtroom. Article 929 of the Civil Procedure Code has expressly recognized the right to silence, and although the Criminal
Procedure Code does not contain a similar provision, the
testimonial privilege is generally accepted in criminal cases as
well.32
Disclosing confidential information in a court proceeding
upon the request of the judge constitutes an exception to Article
458 of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes the disclosure of
medical secrets. A doctor who testifies in a criminal case about
his patient's confidential information cannot be sanctioned for a
breach of the duty of medical secrecy. 33 The decision on
whether to testify and disclose confidential information rests
with the physician, who is to have the patient's best interest in
mind.334 A party or another witness may not oppose the
patient's testimony by invoking medical secrets and may not
prevent the physician from testifying as to confidential
information. 3 5
Furthermore, disclosure of confidential information is
justified under Belgian laws when the disclosure is necessary to
prevent grave and imminent harm to other persons. 6 The socalled "state of necessity" provides justification for disclosing
otherwise confidential information for the enhancement of a
higher cause or value. For example, under the Crown Order of
March 1, 1971, doctors are obligated to notify public health
officials about communicable and venereal diseases.337 Article
331. MICHEL FRANCHIMONT ET AL., MANUEL DE PROCEDURE PENALE 315 (1989)
("Des lors qu'un m6decin par exemple, est appeld comme temoin devant le juge
d'instruction (il en sera d'ailleurs de m~me devant le juge du fond) il a l'obligation de
se presenter, mais i a le choix de parler ou de se taire.").
332. NYS, supra note 309, at 89.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. RYCKMANS & MEERT-VAN DE PUT, supra note 316, at 142.
336. Cass., May 13, 1987, Pasicrisie Belge 1987, 1061, 1063 ("Le m~decin,
auteur d'une violation du secret professionnel, peut 6tre justifi par l'6tat de
n~cessit6, lorsque, sur la base de circonstances de fait. . . et en presence d'un mal
grave et imminent pour autrui, ce m~decin aurait peut estimer qu'il ne lui dtait pas
possible de sauvegarder autrement qu'en commettant cette violation du secret
professionnel un int6rt plus imp~rieux qu'il avait le devoir ou qu'il 6tait en droit de
sauvegarder avant tous les autres.").
337. NYS, supra note 309, at 89.
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20 of the Crown Order of May 31, 1885, allows physicians to
inform authorities about situations that may give rise to
prosecution.338 Moreover, Article 30 of the Criminal Procedure
Code imposes upon every citizen a duty to inform the authorities
about any crime of which he has been a witness.339
In two recent judgments, the Cour de Cassation has
approved the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Liege not to
prosecute a physician who disclosed his patient's confidences
(involving 3illegal
drug abuse and kidnapping) to competent
authorities. 10 When the patient is a victim of a crime, such as
child abuse, the same reasoning permits the physician to
disclose confidential information without being subject to
sanctions for breach of duty. The Cour de Cassation has held
that Article 458 of the Criminal Code is intended to protect the
interest of the patient.34 ' Consequently, Article 458 would not
impede the prosecution of the author of a crime of which the
patient has become a victim. 342 The court held that the
prohibition against disclosure of medical secrets, therefore,
might 34
not
3 apply to facts about how the patient has become a
victim.
II. ANALYSIS: CASE STUDY
The article will now turn to an actual situation in Chad and
analyze the facts of the case in light of the different approaches
to the confidentiality issue in the laws of different jurisdictions.3 '
This section attempts to formulate a coherent
approach concerning a physician's testimony in cases of torture
and other gross violations of human rights.
To provide a thorough analysis of how the different legal
systems function, the article will first present the actual

338. Id. at 90.
339. Id. (emphasis added).
340. Cass., May 8, 1985, Pasicrisie Belge 1106, 1109; Cass., May 13, 1987,
Pasicrisie Belge 1061, 1064.
341. Cass., Feb. 9, 1988, Pasicrisie Belge 662, 663.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Though the incident occurrred in Chad, the law of Chad is not analyzed. As
a former French colony, Chad derived its first code from French Law. See Nellie
Mitchell, The Legal System of Chad, in 6 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA
6.130.12 (Kenneth Robert Redden ed., 1990). Chad has not subsequently developed
any laws that would appear to lead to a distinguishable result from the result under
French law. See id. at 6.130.12-14.
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situation. Then, the article will assume that the situation might
have occurred in each one of the six jurisdictions examined
above, namely (1) a U.S. federal court, (2) a French criminal
court, (3) an English criminal court, (4) a Japanese criminal
court, (5) a Belgian criminal court, and (6) an international
criminal court/tribunal. The purpose of the exercise is to
compare each of the approaches. Within this hypothetical
framework for each country examined, the article will assume
that the situation happened within the borders of that
jurisdiction, that both the accused and the witness are citizens
of that country, and that the relevant criminal court of that
jurisdiction has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction
over the events and the persons involved.345 All questions
concerning choice of law issues and personal jurisdiction
problems are therefore ignored.346 For each jurisdiction five
questions will be answered: (1) would the jurisdiction find that a
physician-patient privilege or a similar privilege exists; (2)
would the jurisdiction find that communications within the

345. It is nonetheless significant to state that torture is considered a crime
against humanity conferring subject matter jurisdiction over any court in the world
to hear a case involving torture, providing the court has personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. The concept of universal jurisdiction refers to the power of a state to
punish certain crimes, wherever and by whomsoever they have been committed,
without any required connection to territory, nationality or special state interest.
MALANCZUK, supra note 21, at 113. International law traditionally allows states to
exercise universal jurisdiction over certain acts which threaten the international
community as a whole, and which are criminal in all countries. The four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 contain provisions that provide universal jurisdiction for grave
breaches of the laws of armed conflict, which include, inter alia, torture and
inhuman treatment. Article 4 of the Torture Convention criminalizes the use of
torture in all State parties, and Articles 5 and 7 of the Torture Convention permit a
State party to prosecute an offender found in its territory even if the alleged act was
not committed within its territorial boundaries. Therefore, even if it is not assumed
that the situation has happened within the particular country examined, a court of
that country possesses universal jurisdiction to try Mr. Habr6 since Chad and all of
the countries examined have ratified the Torture Convention, which empowers them
to exercise such a jurisdiction. See infra note 348 for the status of the prosecution of
Mr. Habr6.
346. It is important to note that even if the choice of law rules point to a
different body of law than the governing substantive law, a court would use the
procedural rules of its own jurisdiction. In accordance with the rules of conflict of
laws of every nation, matters pertaining to procedure are governed by the lex fori
(the law of the forum). Procedural rules may be unintelligible to a foreign judge and
unworkable in a foreign court system. It has been said that a party to a case in a
country must take the law of procedure as he finds it. P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT,
CHESHIRE & NORTH: PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 74 (11th ed. 1987). Therefore,
the governing rules of evidence will probably be that of the forum where the case is
heard.
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relationship were confidential and/or privileged; (3) would the
jurisdiction be likely to allow the doctor to testify despite any
confidence and/or privilege; (4) would the doctor in this fact
situation fall into any exception, or would the doctor be in a
situation analogous in purpose to an existing exception; and (5)
are there any other independent barriers to the doctor's
testimony?
After discussing each jurisdiction's likely decision in the
given fact situation, this article will offer a general argument on
the benefits of allowing doctors to testify. Finally, the article
will conclude by offering a proposed rule and show how this
proposed rule would fit within the present legal framework.
A. THE FACTS
Dr. J. established a clinic in Chad to provide medical and
psychological care to torture victims over a period of several
years.3 ' During that period Dr. J. conducted individual interviews and medical examinations in Chad. The confidentiality of
these medical examinations was expressly assured. Years later,
a prosecution was commenced against the former dictator of
Chad, Hiss~ne Habr6, and several other former officials in a
criminal court.348 Dr. J. was asked to testify during a preliminary proceeding. The investigating judge questioned Dr. J.
as to whether the patients had mentioned that Mr. Habr6
directly participated in the torture sessions. Dr. J. answered
"yes, several times." The judge then asked the doctor to disclose
the names of torturers; the place where torture took place; the
347. For reasons of confidentiality and security, the name of the doctor who
treated torture victims will be kept confidential and the doctor will hereafter be
referred as Dr. J. Dr. J. has cooperated in and consented to the publication of this
article.
348. According to Human Rights Watch, Hissone Habr6 resided in exile in
Senegal when he was indicted by a Senegalese court on charges of torture and
human rights violations. The Senegal Supreme Court ruled in 2002 that Mr. Habr6
could not be tried in Senegal. Senegal has held Mr. Habr6 in detention with the
expectation that Belgium will seek the extradition of Mr. Habr6 under Belgium's
revised "universal jurisdiction" statute. See Belgium: Universal Jurisdiction Law
Repealed, supra note 312; Human Rights Watch, The Case Against Hissone Habrd,
an "African Pinochet," http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2005).
Despite the changes to the "universal jurisdiction" statute, Mr. Habr6's prosecution
will be allowed to continue. See Human Rights Watch, Chronology of the Habr6
Case, http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/10/29/chad9579.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2005). On September 19, 2005, a Belgian court issued an international warrant,
and the Belgian government has requested that Senegal extradite Mr. Habrd to
Belgium. See Amnesty International News Service 279/2005 (Oct. 18, 2005).
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time of the torture; and several other details concerning the
tortuous acts. Dr. J. testified as to most of the information
sought by the judge. It does not appear that the torture victims
were present during the proceedings. The article will hereinafter assume that Dr. J. did not receive any express consent
from the victims.
B. ANALYSIS UNDER VARIOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS

1. The United States
First, a court would need to determine whether a physicianpatient relationship existed. U.S. courts recognize both a
physician-patient relationship and a psychotherapist-patient
relationship. 3 9 A U.S. court would recognize a physician-patient
relationship between Dr. J. and the torture victims.35 ° The fact
that most of the torture victims did not pay for the treatment
would not preclude this relationship.35 1 Based on Jaffee v.
Redmond, the court would also recognize a psychotherapistpatient privilege for that portion of the relationship that was
intended to treat mental illness.352
Second, the court must examine whether this relationship
was confidential or privileged. U.S. doctors are bound to treat
their relationships with patients as confidential. 5 3 Certainly,
Dr. J.'s relationships with the patients would be confidential;
however, only a portion of the relationship would be
privileged.
U.S. federal courts do not recognize any physicianpatient privilege, but they do recognize an absolute
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 355
Any part of Dr. J.'s
relationship with the torture victims that primarily related to
their mental health would be privileged under the psychotherapist-patient privilege.356 Any part of Dr. J.'s relationship
with the torture victims that primarily related to treating their

349.
350.

See supra notes 88-131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88-129 and accompanying text.

351.
352.

See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 117-129 and accompanying text.

353.
354.

See supra notes 139-147 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 88-129, 139-147 and accompanying text. Notes 139-147

explain that all communications are confidential, while notes 88-129 explain that a
testimonial privilege only attaches in certain jurisdictions or settings.
355.
356.

See supra notes 88-129 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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physical health would not be covered under any privilege.3 57
It should be noted that if a federal court is sitting in
diversity jurisdiction in a civil case, the federal court would be
required to apply state law. 5 s Most states do recognize some
form of physician-patient privilege.359 In this event, all of Dr.
J.'s conversations and treatments provided to the victims would
be privileged.3 6 °
Third, given that any portion of the physician-patient
relationship that relates to physical health is not protected by
privilege in federal court, Dr. J. would be able to testify about
the results of the torture. Dr. J. could also testify about the
methods of torture and the perpetrators of these acts if Dr. J.
discovered the information while treating the physical injuries
to his patients. Only if Dr. J. discovered the methods and
identities of the perpetrators while treating the victim's mental
health would Dr. J. be prohibited from testifying. If the civil
case is in diversity jurisdiction, Dr. J. would be unable to testify
if the applicable state's laws provided for a physician-patient
privilege. A breach of this confidential 3relationship
could result
61
in professional sanctions and civil suits.
Fourth, under the federal rules, there is no physicianpatient privilege and therefore no exceptions exist. The federal
courts have not provided an exception to the psychotherapistpatient privilege.362 If Dr. J. became involved in a federal action
where state laws applied, Dr. J.'s information could fall within
an exception. Most states provide for reporting incidents of
violence especially where the victims are elderly, children, or
the mentally incompetent.36 3 Dr. J.'s patients were the victims
of violence, and some of the victims could have been elderly,
children, or mentally incompetent. It is also not difficult to
argue for an extension by analogy. The goal of the state
exceptions is to aid the state in protecting victims of violent acts
and punish persons who perpetrate these crimes. In particular,
the goal of both is to protect those persons who may be to afraid
to testify against the perpetrators.
Fifth, the United States is one of the few countries that still

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supra note 93 and accompanying text.
supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
supra notes 105-107 and accompanying text.
supra notes 157-165 and accompanying text.
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text.
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Portions of Dr. J.'s testimony, particularly
has a hearsay rule.
that part that identifies Mr. Habr6 as the perpetrator of the
torture, would fall under the hearsay rule.365 Dr. J.'s testimony
about the medical condition of the victims would be admitted
under the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. 366 It
is also possible that Dr. J. could identify Mr. Habr6 under the
excited utterance exception.36 7 This exception would only work if
the victims sought Dr. J.'s care promptly after the incident; if
several days passed, the court would likely find that the victims
had too much time to contemplate the event and the torture
would be inadmissible hearsay. 68
2. France
First, a French court would treat Dr. J.'s relationship with
the torture victims as a physician-patient relationship. 60
Unlike U.S. courts, French courts do not treat physicians
differently then psychologists. 3 70
Second, under French law, Dr. J.'s communications would
be considered confidential.
Article 4 of the Ethical Code
obligates Dr. J. to keep clients' secrets.371 A French court would
allow Dr. J. to invoke this confidentiality to establish that the
communications were privileged. 2
Third, without the consent of the victims Dr. J. would be
prevented from testifying. The victim's consent alone, however,
would not be enough to force Dr. J. to testify. 3 If there was
patient consent, Dr. J. could choose whether to testify.374
Fourth, Dr. J. faces a particularly difficult problem in
France which requires neither the intent to injure nor an injury
in fact for the physician to be punished for revealing secrets.
Dr. J. would have an available exception to Article 226-13 under
Article 226-14.376 It could be argued that the torture victims fall
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.

See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 171-174 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 181-182 and accompanying text.
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 199-209 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206-209 and accompanying text.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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within those "persons incapable of defending themselves against
deprivation and injustice. , 37
If the victims fall within this
category, Dr. J. would have the ability to inform judicial or
administrative authorities of the injuries or ill-treatment. 7 8 If
Dr. J. is able to fall within this exception, there would be a way
of avoiding criminal action and/or sanctions. Even if Dr. J. does
not fall within the exception, it is also not entirely clear whether
a doctor who chooses to testify under Article 109 will be subject
to liability under Article 226-13. 379
Finally, French law does not have a hearsay rule to prevent
the testimony of Dr. J.
3. The United Kingdom
First, Dr. J.'s relationship with the torture victims would be
considered a physician-patient relationship.
Like France,
physicians and psychologists are not treated differently.
Second, English courts do not recognize any privileges other
than an attorney-client privilege.8 °
English doctors are
obligated to treat their communications with patients confidentially.
In England, Dr. J. could be subject to civil action
and professional sanctions if there is a violation of this
secrecy. 2
Third, in England, without a court order, Dr. J. should not
testify.38 3 Under these circumstances Dr. J. could be subject to
sanctions and civil action.3 4 If a court orders a doctor to testify,
the GMC allows Dr. J. to testify without fear of sanctions.3 5
Fourth, Dr. J. has an available exception. The GMC
provides that doctors can testify if it is in the public interest.38
If a doctor testifies under this exception, he or she will not face
professional sanctions.3 87 It is almost certain that testifying
about acts of torture 3and
the perpetrator of these acts would be
8
in the public interest.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 223-241 and accompanying
See supra notes 242-250 and accompanying
See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 259-265 and accompanying
See supra notes 264-265 and accompanying
See supra notes 259-265 and accompanying
See supra notes 251-258 and accompanying
See supra notes 251-258 and accompanying
See supra notes 251-258 and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
text.
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Fifth, England has eliminated the hearsay exception in both
civil and criminal actions.389
4. Japan
First, a Japanese court would consider the relationship
between Dr. J. and the victims to be within a physician-patient
privilege. Japanese law does 3not
90 appear to distinguish between
a physician and a psychologist.
Second, in Japan the relationship would be confidential and
privileged.
Though Article 143 of the Japanese Code of
Criminal Procedure enables Japanese courts to call any
witnesses, Article 149 would allow Dr. J.'s patients to invoke a
privilege preventing Dr. J.'s testimony.391 Article 134 of the
Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure and Article 14 of the
Medical Practitioners' Law in Japan deem the information
confidential and establish that the doctor is legally obligated to
protect that privacy. 92
Third, without a court order, a Japanese court may hold
that Dr. J. testified without cause.393 This holding would subject
Dr. J. to civil action and professional sanctions.39 4 When
deciding how to rule, a Japanese court would be guided by the
Confucian notion of benevolence toward patients.395 Under this
notion the physician would be granted leeway to act in a way
the doctor believes is best for the patient.9 6 So, if Dr. J. felt it
was best for the victims of torture to have the perpetrator
exposed, a court would be more likely to allow Dr. J. to violate
the confidentiality. If a court ordered Dr. J. to testify and Dr. J.
felt it was in the best interest of the victims, a Japanese court
would almost certainly decide that Dr. J. testified with cause.
In these circumstances Dr. J. would be protected from professional sanctions and civil action.
Fourth, Japan does not have a reporting requirement for
doctors or a public interest exception.
Fifth, Japan does not have a hearsay rule.

389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
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See
See
See
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supra notes
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5. Belgium
First, Belgium would consider Dr. J.'s relationship to the
torture victims to be a physician-patient relationship. Belgium
does not appear 97to differentiate between a physician and a
psychotherapist.
Second, under Belgian law this relationship would be
confidential and privileged. Article 458 of the Belgian Criminal
Code and Article 929 of the Civil Procedure Code provide that
physician-patient communications are privileged and conTitle II of Chapter V of the 1975 Code of
fidential.398
Professional Ethics also provides that physician-patient
communications are confidential in Belgium.399
Third, Article 458 makes it a criminal offense for doctors to
testify in Belgium unless they are "required to give evidence in
court or were obliged, by law, to disclose those secrets."4 °° A
physician could also be civilly liable for testifying in violation of
this statute.0 1 If a court requires a physician to testify, that
physician falls within the exception to Article 458.402 A doctor
testifying under a court order is also protected against civil
liability and professional sanctions.
Fourth, even without a court order a doctor may be able to
testify under several exceptions. Belgian law allows a doctor to
inform authorities about events that may give rise to criminal
There is also a "state of necessity" exception,
prosecutions.0
which allows a physician to disclose confidential information if
it promotes a higher cause or value.40 4
Fifth, there is no hearsay rule in Belgium.
6. InternationalCourts and Tribunals
First, both the ICC and ICTY would acknowledge a
physician-patient relationship existed between Dr. J. and the
torture victims.
Second, the ICTY and the ICTR only recognize an attorney-

397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

supranotes 309-343 and accompanying text.
supranotes 315-316, 332 and accompanying text.
supranotes 317-324 and accompanying text.
supra notes 333-335 and accompanying text.
supra note 328 and accompanying text.
supra notes 333-335 and accompanying text.
supra note 338 and accompanying text.
supra note 336-337 and accompanying text.
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client privilege."' The ICTY's rules did allow • a406witness to
decline to testify if the information is confidential.
The ICC
rules expressly recognize a physician-patient privilege. 7 The
ICC would also treat any communications between psychiatrist
and patient as privileged.0
Third, when determining whether to permit a privilege
holder to testify, international tribunals defer to the privilege
holder. 40 9 Therefore, Dr. J. would be permitted, but not
compelled, to testify.
Fourth, the basic purpose for exceptions that permit doctors
to testify without the consent of patients is to protect the doctors
against civil or criminal liability. International courts and
tribunals do not hold their witnesses civilly or criminally liable
so these jurisdictions do not have exceptions. A doctor wishing
to testify would likely want to look to the jurisdiction where the
relationship occurred and possibly the doctor's own jurisdiction
to see if the testimony would be protected under any exceptions.
Fifth, there is no hearsay rule in international courts.410
7. Summary of Dr.J.'s Ability to Testify in Each Jurisdiction
If Dr. J. had met with the victims in the United States, Dr.
J. would be allowed to testify about information acquired while
healing physical ailments, but would not be able to testify as to
information acquired healing the victims' mental health. If the
events had occurred in France, Dr. J. would be permitted to
testify with the patient's consent, or if it were determined that
the victims fell into the class of those persons unable to protect
themselves. If the events occurred in England, Dr. J. would be
permitted to testify. In Japan, Dr. J. would rely on his/her
professional judgment as to whether the testimony is in the
patient's best interest. In Belgium, Dr. J. would be permitted to
testify with a court order, or under various exceptions. Finally,
in an international court or tribunal Dr. J. would be permitted
405. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
406. See supra notes 41 and accompanying text.
407. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. Though the employee who
wished to testify was not permitted to in the ICRC case, the ICTY held that the
employee was precluded from testifying only because it was the ICRC and not the
employee who held the privilege in that case. Here it would appear that Dr. J.
would stand in the position of the ICRC and would therefore hold the privilege. Id.
410. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
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to testify.
C. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF PHYSICIANS IN PROSECUTING HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES AND THE NEED FOR AN EXCEPTION TO THE
CONFIDENTIALITY RULE

The final issue is whether a universal exception to the duty
of confidentiality ought to be carved out for physicians who
become recipients of information concerning human rights
violations and who are afterward summoned to testify before a
criminal court.
When summoned to the criminal court, Dr. J. encountered a
situation in which two conflicting obligations created an ethical
dilemma.
One is the obligation to testify truthfully and
accurately to help the evidentiary process of fact-gathering, and
the other is the duty of confidentiality. It is a typical dilemma
professionals face who, as part of their activities promoting
human rights and protecting victims, witness human rights
violations by simply being present in the field. This dilemma is
accentuated with medical professionals treating torture victims
because, by virtue of the treatment, they are likely to observe
many of the most useful types of evidence."'
The laws of different jurisdictions offer varying solutions to
this dilemma, each providing less than comprehensive
protection for a testifying professional. Some jurisdictions
preclude criminal or civil actions for breach of confidentiality
when a court obliges the physician to disclose the confidential
information. Still, some jurisdictions require the physician to
refuse to testify even with a court order. Several jurisdictions
require physicians to report the abuse of vulnerable persons or
wounds inflicted by deadly weapons, but most of the existing
reporting requirements fail expressly to incorporate injuries
resulting from torture or other human rights abuses. Overall,
national laws have yet to address the problem of a doctor or
human rights professional who is bound by the duty of
confidentiality but is nonetheless willing to disclose some
relevant information related to torture, a crime against

411.

See CAMILLE GIFFARD, HUMAN RIGHTS CENTRE, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX, THE

TORTURE REPORTING HANDBOOK (2000), http://essex.ac.uk/torturehandbook/
english.htm (noting useful types of information including medical evidence, physical
evidence, psychological evidence, statements of the victims, statements of witnesses,
and expert medical testimony and that it is only logical that a doctor treating torture
victims would have access to most if not all these forms of information).
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humanity, or other grave human rights abuse.
Dr. J.'s dilemma is accentuated by some additional factorstorture is usually perpetrated in a location where there are few
witnesses and is often difficult to prove. An international
criminal court or tribunal usually faces considerable difficulties
in fact-gathering and would be in great need of a professional's
testimony who had observed the torture's physical and
psychological effects and who had received information from
persons with first-hand knowledge. In Dr. J.'s situation, the
prosecution and the court/tribunal may be unable to find
witnesses to testify against the former dictator of a country.
Another factor that may have induced Dr. J. to testify may be
the fact that it was Dr. J. who opened a clinic in the country to
treat victims and to protect them. Part of Dr. J.'s mission as a
promoter of human rights in Chad was to care for victims and
prevent future violations. Unlike the ICRC,4 12 Dr. J. has no
institutional need to assure continual access to the victims in
Chad. Dr. J. may have found the violations were significant,
that confidential efforts might not end the violations, that the
disclosure would benefit the threatened persons, and that
violations were verified through reliable sources.
The ethical dilemma that awaits many physicians working
in the human rights field begs the following question: should the
physicians, who would like to disclose confidential information
in a criminal process in order to assist the prosecution of a
human rights violator, be exempt from the duty of
confidentiality?
The response to that question necessarily
entails balancing two sets of interests: the public interest in
bringing the perpetrators to justice against the public interest of
adequate care for the victims of human rights abuses and the
privacy interests of the threatened and injured persons.
There are several arguments against any exemption to the
duty of confidentiality. First, there is a concern that the victims
of abuse would be afraid to seek treatment if they felt that their
medical conditions would become a matter of public record.
Second, the violators of human rights abuses would be more
likely to keep out medical providers seeking to treat the victims
of their abuse if they thought those individuals would later
testify against them. Finally, those who provide care to the
victims of human rights abuses might themselves become
targets if the violators believe those care providers will testify
412.

See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
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against them.
Despite these problems, within the context of prosecuting
human rights violations the scales tilt toward the public
interest, i.e. creating an exception to the duty of confidentiality
for physicians.
First, in a criminal court with evidentiary rules similar to
the ICC, numerous provisions related to witness protection
would provide adequate protection for victims' personal
information such as their identities, locations, and professions.
By incorporating the scheme devised by the ICC, it is possible to
achieve reliable
and
accurate
fact-gathering
without
jeopardizing the safety of witnesses. Protecting the victim's
identities should address the first argument against any
exception to confidentiality.
Additionally, by protecting
witnesses' identities one can partially address the concern that
the care givers will be attacked as the perpetrators of abuse
would not know which doctors have testified in the past (though,
admittedly, this measure would not address indiscriminate
attacks on medical providers).
Second, despite the fear of future retaliation against them
or their families, at least some torture victims would still be
willing to help prosecute the perpetrator. In jurisdictions where
patients hold the privilege of confidentiality for medical
communications, some of the victims may waive it to allow the
physician to testify or testify themselves. The perpetrator's
conviction and incarceration would inevitably decrease the
possibility of future violations by the same person and possibly
by others.
Third, given an international court's and prosecutor's
limited fact-finding abilities and limited ability to locate former
patients, a physician who received information from people with
first-hand knowledge is an invaluable resource. Providing the
trustworthiness of the victims' statements is established, Dr.
J.'s testimony is extremely relevant and probative during trial.
Considering the evidentiary difficulties of establishing the
elements of the crime of torture which took place in a country
under a dictatorial government, the criminal court or the
prosecutor should have the authority to encourage human rights
activists to come forward and disclose relevant information.
Fourth, the recognition of torture as a crime against
humanity and the universal renunciation of torture have moved
the international community closer to prioritizing prosecution
over privacy interests.
A universal agreement exempting
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physicians from testimonial consequences is consistent with the
Torture Convention's call for member states to take active
measures to prevent torture. The provisions of the Torture
Convention urge State Parties to take measures for the
prevention of torture. For the countries examined above, it
would be sensible to include torture injuries within the
If most of the countries
mandatory reporting statutes.
examined above have already decided to forego confidentiality in
order to protect against the abuse of children and elderly
persons, the extra step to protect vulnerable torture victims
would not be difficult. The widespread acceptance of the
Torture Convention and the other treaties barring torture,
coupled with the growing international consensus that crimes
against humanity must be prosecuted, support a universal
exception for physicians wanting to testify about torture.
D. A PROPOSED RULE CODIFYING THE RIGHT OF PHYSICIANS TO
TESTIFY WHEN THEY WITNESS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE
COURSE OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITIES

While the various jurisdictions discussed vary in their
approach to the physician-patient privilege, it is still possible to
draft a rule to respond to the human rights abuses while
acknowledging the concerns of each. A rule could read:
Any physician, or similar medical professional, is
allowed to testify before any international tribunal or
national criminal proceeding without fear of criminal
or civil repercussions in any country when all of the
following conditions are present:
(1) The doctor wishes to testify;
(2) The victim(s) consent, or if the victim(s) cannot
be located or identified, the court appoints counsel to
act on behalf of the victim(s)'s best interests;
(3) A judge will be the finder of fact, or if a jury is a
finder of fact, a judge will first screen the testimony
of any physician prior to its presentation to the jury
with attention to any exceedingly prejudicial
information; and
(4) The court requests the testimony.
This rule addresses many of the concerns of the various
jurisdictions studied in this article. For the United States,
which would likely allow Dr. J. to testify, point three addresses
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the concerns of the hearsay rule. The United States is the only
country that maintains a hearsay rule, which reflects a concern
that juries would not properly weigh hearsay evidence.
French law requires patient consent and the doctor's desire
to testify before a doctor testifies. The first and second points
ensure that the doctor wishes to testify and provide for patient
consent or at least a hearing on the patient's best interest prior
to the doctor's testimony.
The United Kingdom currently allows doctors to testify
when a court orders them to do so. Point four requires the court
to request the testimony prior to having the doctor testify.
Though this is a request, the basis of the request is analogous to
the basis for in order in British law.
Japanese doctors must act with the best interests of their
patients in mind. Point one requires that the doctor wants to
testify. Presumably the doctor believes that it is in the best
interests of the victims if the doctor wants to testify. This point
should meet the requirement under Japanese law that a doctor
testify only with cause.
Belgian law allows doctors to testify under court order. This
is largely met by point four's request on the part of the court.
Additionally, Belgian law allows the doctor to testify when there
is a public policy interest in doing so. The court will consider
the public policy against torture when determining whether to
order a doctor's testimony.
CONCLUSION
This article provides an example of an actual situation
where a doctor working in the human rights field is faced with
two contradictory obligations: either helping the prosecution of a
perpetrator of human rights abuses or obeying the professional
code of conduct as narrowly construed. It also explores several
national legal systems and the current status of international
law related to this issue. This article suggests an alternative
way to approach the issue by offering a restatement of the law
that would provide the greatest protection of human rights.

